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INTRODUCTION
Dignity remains the core aspirational value in the struggle for ra-
cial justice. For Americans of African descent, the relentless demand
to be treated with respect and equal humanity resonates in virtually
every sector of intellectual and cultural life. The idea of dignity has
been deployed consistently and consciously for more than a century
to expose the absurdity of racial injustice in America-from Freder-
ick Douglass's noble assertion that the Negro is "self-evidently a man,
and therefore entitled to all the rights and privileges which belong to
human nature"' to Martin Luther King, Jr.'s deep meditation on the
motivations of civil rights proponents to Harlem Renaissance poet
Claude McKay's fatalistic declaration that "If we must die, 0 let us
nobly die... then even the monsters we defy [s]hall be constrained
to honor us though dead!"3 to the late rapper Tupac Shakur's lyrical
condemnation of the crisis of poverty and social isolation that charac-
terizes life in forgotten segments of the black community. 4 These
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and colleagues on the law faculty at Washington University School of Law-especially Tomiko
Brown-Nagin, Steve Gunn, Pauline Kim, Troy Paredes, and Laura Rosenbury-and my research
assistant Michelle Tham.
I Frederick Douglass, Prejudice Against Color, THE NORTH STAR, June 13, 1850, reprinted in 2
THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS 127, 130 (Philip S. Foner ed., Int'l Publishers
1975).
2 MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., Letter from Birmingham City Jail, in WHY WE CAN'T WAIT (1963),
reprinted in A TESTAMENT OF HOPE: THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 289
(James M. Washington ed., Harper & Row 1986) [hereinafter A TESTAMENT OF HOPE].
'Claude McKay, If We Must Die, in BLACK VOICES: AN ANTHOLOGY OF AFRO-AMERICAN
LITERATURE 372-73 (Abraham Chapman ed., 1968).
4 Shakur writes:
How can I feel guilty after all tha things they did to me
Sweated me, hunted me
Trapped in my own community
One day I'm gonna bust
Blow up on this society
Why did ya lie to me?
I couldn't find a trace of equality
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dramatic instances of agonistic assertiveness represent far more than
individualized political or cultural expression -they are moments
Work me like a slave while they laid back
Homie don't play that
It's time to let'em suffer tha payback.
TUPAC SHAKUR, Trapped, on 2PACALYPSE Now (Jive Records 1991).
5 The call for the affirmance of African American dignity figured prominently in the intro-
spective literary work of Ralph Ellison and protest novels of Richard Wright. See generally RALPH
ELLISON, INVISIBLE MAN (1952) (providing a unique commentary of the continuing degrada-
tion of Black America through the story of a nameless narrator who feels "invisible" because of
his race); RICHARD WRIGHT, NATIVE SON (1940) (telling the story of Bigger Thomas, a young
black man who faces oppression and racial injustice and comes to define his life and find his
place in the world through violence). James Baldwin, in The Fire Next Time, similarly laments the
failure of whites to acknowledge the "unassailable dignity" of blacks. In an essay to his young
nephew on the racial world he would soon face in adulthood, Baldwin wrote:
[Y]ou come from sturdy, peasant stock, men who picked cotton and dammed rivers and
built railroads, and, in the teeth of the most terrifying odds, achieved an unassailable
and monumental dignity. You come from a long line of great poets, some of the greatest
poets since Homer. One of them said, "The very time I thought I was lost, My dungeon
shook and my chains fell off."
You know, and I know, that the country is celebrating one hundred years of free-
dom one hundred years too soon.
JAMES BALDWIN, Letter to My Nephew on the One Hundredth Anniversary of the Emancipation, in THE
FIRE NEXTTIME 24 (1963) (emphasis removed).
The idea of dignity would later emerge in soul music of the '60s and '70s, as well as some as-
pects of hip-hop. See BRIAN WARD, JUST MY SOUL RESPONDING: RHYTHM AND BLUES, BLACK
CONSCIOUSNESS, AND RACE RELATIONS 211, 361-62 (1998) (commenting upon the racial politics
in James Brown's 1968 anthem "Say it Loud-I'm Black and I'm Proud," with its "obvious, if
effective" lyrics "we'd rather die on our feet, than keep livin' on our knees" and recounting the
galvanizing effect of Aretha Franklin's remake of Otis Redding's "Respect" on the creation of
'overtly engaged, political soul songs"); Tshombe Walker, Hip Hop and the Rap Music Industry, in
AFRICAN AMERICAN JAZZ AND RAP 211, 214 (1997) (describing hip-hop as "primarily an expres-
sion of the honor of being black in racist America"); see also CRAIG WERNER, A CHANGE IS
GONNA COME: MUSIC, RACE & THE SOUL OF AMERICA 239-40 (1998) (noting that some hip-hop
pioneers, such as Afrika Bambaata, traced their political awareness to politically conscious soul
artists, including James Brown and Sly Stone, as well as civil rights leaders Malcolm X, Martin
Luther King, Jr., and Louis Farrakhan).
One might similarly interpret the triumphs of boxers Jack Johnson, Joe Louis, and Muham-
mad Ali, and baseball legendJackie Robinson as part of this quest for dignity. See RICHARD BAK,
JOE LOUIS: THE GREAT BLACK HOPE (1996) (discussing Joe Louis's history and triumphs);
THOMAS R. HIETALA, THE FIGHT OF THE CENTURY: JACK JOHNSON, JOE LOUIS, AND THE
STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 11 (2002) (noting that "Johnson and Louis affected the nation
and its people far beyond the ring"); JACKJOHNSON, JACK JOHNSON-IN THE RING-AND OUT
(1927) (describing the author's life and boxing career); THE MUHAMMAD ALl READER (Gerald
Early ed., 1998) (providing several analyses on the life of Muhammad Ali); RANDY ROBERTS,
PAPAJACK: JACKJOHNSON AND THE ERA OF WHITE HOPES (1983) (discussing Jack Johnson's ca-
reer); SCoTr SIMON, JACKIE ROBINSON AND THE INTEGRATION OF BASEBALL 5 (2002) (suggesting
that "[i]t is possible to see, in Robinson's slow, purposeful walk into the face of taunts and
threats, some of the same unbowed courage that Americans would later admire in the civil
rights marchers who faced down stinging water sprays, sharp rocks, and snapping police dogs");
JULES TYGIEL, BASEBALL'S GREAT EXPERIMENT: JACKIE ROBINSON AND HIS LEGACY 9 (1997) (not-
ing that "[ t ] he integration of baseball represented both a symbol of imminent racial challenge
and a direct agent of social change" because it "captured the imagination of millions of Ameri-
cans who had previously ignored the nation's racial dilemma").
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constitutive of a common, transhistorical call for the acknowledg-
ment and affirmation of African American dignity.
The struggle for racial justice in America, then, is perhaps best
understood as a struggle to secure dignity in the face of sustained ef-
forts to degrade and dishonor persons on the basis of color. The
concepts of dignity and subordination are powerfully linked. The
harm of racial subordination includes not only dignitary harms such
as intentional and unintentional racist acts, but material injuries such
as diminished health, wealth, income, employment and social status.
Racial subordination, however, takes place within and against a
framework of dignity. The creation, toleration, or defense of racially
subordinating features of society-features that have the effect of en-
trenching second-class citizenship for members of such socially disfa-
vored groups-are discretionary acts, and each of these discretionary
acts rests upon perceptions of humanity and social worth, or dignity.
Unexamined beliefs in the relative lack of dignity possessed by blacks,
for example, are often relied upon to explain and justify subordinat-
ing practices. Not surprisingly, a substantial number of legal thinkers
have engaged in sustained efforts to emphasize dignitary concerns in
the contemporary legal struggle for racial justice.6 Nevertheless, con-
6 The idea of dignity figures prominently among antisubordinationists. The classic state-
ment of the antisubordination principle was articulated by Professor Owen Fiss, who argued
that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits a law or official practice that "aggravates (or per-
petuates?) the subordinate position of a specially disadvantaged group." Owen M. Fiss, Groups
and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 157 (1976). Critical theorists have explic-
itly advanced this proposition in various forms for some time now. See Christopher A. Bracey,
Adjudication, Antisubordination, and the Jazz Connection, 54 ALA. L. REV. 853, 862 (2003) ("Consti-
tutional adjudication that strives to realize democracy, then, encourages courts to embrace the
antisubordination principle when deciding cases that pit minority rights and interests against
majority rule."); Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation
and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARv. L. REV. 1331, 1386 (1988) (observing that
"[t]he struggle of Blacks, like that of all subordinated groups, is a struggle for inclusion, an at-
tempt to manipulate elements of the dominant ideology to transform the experience of domi-
nation" and that "[iut is a struggle to create a new status quo through the ideological and politi-
cal tools that are available"); Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is Color-Blind", 44 STAN.
L. REV. 1, 68 (1991) (discussing the danger of courts focusing on formal race rather than the
"reality of racial subordination"); Charles R. Lawrence III, Foreword: Race, Multiculturalism, and
theJurisprudence of Transformation, 47 STAN. L. REV. 819, 824 (1995) (discussing the consideration
of "racial equality as a substantive societal condition rather than as an individual right"); MariJ.
Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
323 (1987) (asking scholars to focus on subordinated individuals and groups when developing
theories of racial justice); Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of
Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1453-54 (1991) (observing that
"the antisubordination approach considers the concrete effects of government policy on the
substantive condition of the disadvantaged"); Robin West, Progressive and Conservative Constitu-
tionalism, 88 MICH. L. REV. 641, 694 (1990) (arguing that "'[e]qual protection,' for the progres-
sive, means the eradication of social, economic, and private, as well as legal, hierarchies that
damage").
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temporary race jurisprudence remains a profound disappointment
precisely because it fails to take seriously the crucial and, in light of
the comfort engendered through the tacit embrace of white privi-
lege, deeply unsettling tasks of acknowledgment and affirmance of
universal, undifferentiated dignity for historically subordinated racial
minorities.
The idea of dignity is not altogether foreign in American law. The
Supreme Court has, from time to time, demonstrated responsiveness
to dignitary concerns in a variety of contexts, including race rela-
tions. The criticism I advance in this Article is that we appear to be
in the midst of a dignitary downcycle in the race relations context-a
period in which dignity is currently undervalued. Importantly, this
undervaluation of dignity creates an air of unreality and non-
responsiveness to Court pronouncements on race matters, which in
turn reinforces chronic impediments to the promotion and realiza-
tion of substantive racial justice in this country.
The roots of American racial pathology are in Negro slavery, and a
crucial constituent element of slavery was the ritual dishonor and
degradation of those enslaved.9 If law is implicated not only in terms
Others scholars have offered similar views. See Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword: The Document and
the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 64 (2000) (observing that "the Fourteenth Amendment fram-
ers clearly aimed to prohibit [the Black Codes] as a paradigm case of impermissible legisla-
tion"); Michael W. McConnell, The Importance of Humility in Judicial Review: A Comment on Ronald
Dworkin's "Moral Reading" of the Constitution, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1269, 1281 (1997) ("The clear-
est and most indisputable purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to provide constitutional
authority for the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which outlawed the Black Codes."); Cass Sunstein, The
Anticaste Principle, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2410, 2429 (1994) (observing that "[i]nstead of asking 'Are
blacks or women similarly situated to whites or men, and if so have they been treated differ-
ently?' we should ask 'Does the law or practice in question contribute to the maintenance of
second-class citizenship, or lower-caste status, for blacks or women?").
At the same time, there are a number of scholars who maintain that the removal of racial
stigma should not be a priority in the struggle for racial justice because it does little to change
material conditions of oppression. See discussion infra text accompanying notes 210-13.
For a discussion of the idea of dignity in American law, see infra Part I.B.
8 By substantive racial justice, I mean to refer to policies, initiatives, and norms that are self-
consciously employed to promote and achieve real progressive changes in the material condi-
tions of subordinated racial minorities. Antidiscrimination law and other policies that promote
formal equality and equal opportunity are certainly crucial elements to the racial justice equa-
tion. Substantive racial justice goes further insofar as it places greater emphasis on material and
redistributive approaches directed at concrete manifestations of deep-seated subordination,
such as chronic disparities in wealth, health, employment, and education. For a fuller discus-
sion of these disparities, see infra text accompanying notes 152-61.
Slavery represents the ultimate expression of power-absolute power for the master and
absolute powerlessness for the slave. But it also presents a most obvious means of imposing so-
cial, economic, and cultural isolation. Degradation, dishonor, and remarkable disparities in
socioeconomic well-being were both the desired and the intended consequences of slavery. See
ORLANDO PATTERSON, SLAVERY AND SOCIAL DEATH: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 183 (1982) (noting
that if a slave attempted "to acquire the trappings of an honorable person and to deny his in-
herent baseness, then the law came down on him with all its force").
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of creating the necessary conditions for race-based dignitary harm,
but actively participating in ritualized degradation of blacks and
other minorities, it would seem to follow naturally that race jurispru-
dence would be, at a minimum, sensitive to dignitary concerns when
addressing racial issues in a contemporary setting.
This naturally insurgent need to address issues of dignity in the
pursuit of racial justice, however, is complicated by the prevailing
view that legal remedies for offenses to honor and dignity are rightly
difficult to come by. As Southern historian Bertram Wyatt-Brown ex-
plains: "The courts and lawmakers never put honor into statutory or
judicial form because it was commonly understood that there should
be a division between the workings of the law and the stalwart defense
of a man's sense of self."' °
Professor Brown perhaps overstates the case, as one can point to a
host of dignitary torts as modern, real-world examples of concrete le-
However, not all slaves experienced slavery in the identical manner, and there are numerous
accounts of the exercise of black agency throughout the slavery era. See ROBERT C. DICK, BLACK
PROTEST: ISSUES AND TACTICS (1974) (chronicling efforts of "Negro spokesmen" to advance the
anti-slavery agency by appealing to slaves, free blacks, and sympathetic whites); GEORGE P.
RAWICK, FROM SUNDOWN TO SUNUP: THE MAKING OF THE BLACK COMMUNITY (1972) (providing
an account of slavery in America that emphasizes the humanity of the slave through the gener-
ous use of slave narratives); WILLIE LEE ROSE, SLAVERY & FREEDOM 3-17 (William W. Freehling
ed., 1982) (offering examples of the exercise of black agency and autonomy during the Ameri-
can Revolution); Gerald W. Mullin, Rethinking American Negro Slavery from the Vantage Point of the
Colonial Era, in THE AFRO-AMERICAN SLAVES: COMMUNITY OR CHAOS? 24 (Randall M. Miller ed.,
1981) [hereinafter THE AFRO-AMERICAN SLAVES] (describing reports of "boondoggling, feigned
illness, truancy and theft" by slaves during the colonial era). Although some of these instances
involved dramatic moments of insurrection, more often blacks exercised human agency in the
more mundane aspects of everyday life. See, e.g., Lawrence W. Levine, Slave Songs and Slave Con-
sciousness, in THE AFRO-AMERICAN SLAVES, supra, at 62 (suggesting that the antebellum slave
spiritual tradition can be interpreted as an act of defiance and self-conscious identity formation
by blacks).
10 BERTRAM WYATT-BROWN, SOUTHERN HONOR: ETHICS & BEHAVIOR IN THE OLD SOUTH 305
(1982). Aversion to perceived stigmatic harm associated with claiming victim status is fairly
commonplace among members of subordinated groups. See, e.g., SHELBY STEELE, THE CONTENT
OF OUR CHARACTER: A NEW VISION OF RACE IN AMERICA 118-19 (1990) (suggesting that affirma-
tive action encourages a "victim-focused mentality" among blacks that is both stigmatic and un-
dermining of racial progress); Martha Minow, Surviving Victim Talk, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1411,
1420-21 (1993) (noting that some women and minorities may be hesitant to complain about
discriminatory experiences because antidiscrimination law requires the complainant to adopt a
"submissive posture" and to appear as "a powerless and defeated victim" that must seek "pater-
nal protection from a court"); Vince Beiser, Groundbreaking at New Holocaust Museum Rekindles the
Old Debate About Priorities, JERUSALEM REP., Oct. 20, 1994, at 35 (noting concern among some
Jews that the Holocaust museum places an unhealthy overemphasis on Jewish victimization "at
the expense of contemporary Jewish culture and heroes"); Clyde Haberman, Memories of Holo-
caust, and Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 1996, at BI (noting pockets of Jewish opposition to Holo-
caust museums because they foster a "culture of victimization"). But see, e.g., FREDERICK R.
LYNCH, INVISIBLE VICTIMS: WHITE MALES AND THE CRISIS OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 109-17 (1989)
(describing white males as innocent victims of affirmative action policy, and noting that critics
of such policies are often ignored or vilified).
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gal remedies available for affronts to honor and dignity. Actions that
humiliate, torment, pressure, demean, or outrage a reasonable per-
son-examples include assault, false imprisonment, malicious prose-
cution, outrageous conduct, defamation, and invasion of privacy-
can be understood as injurious to the person's dignitary interest and
give rise to tort-based liability."
Despite these developments, law has yet to carve out meaningful
space for race-based harm to personal dignity. The reason for this
may lie in Brown's admission, for his comment reflects a core belief
that seeking restoration or acknowledgment of dignity through law
serves only to reaffirm one's degraded status, further deepening the
crisis of self-worth and social value. It is this belief that animates Mi-
chel de Montaigne's unflinching assessment that "[h]e who appeals
to the laws to get satisfaction for an offense to his honor[] dishonors
himself.' 2 If we take this view seriously, then one might reasonably
conclude that the affirmance of dignity for African Americans has
remained elusive precisely because blacks have chosen to appeal to
institutions of civil society for a declaration of equal humanity.
Whatever one might think of traditional codes of honor among
men, it is clear that universal declarations of dignity and equal hu-
manity have become almost commonplace in modern civil society.
13
At the same time, the hallmarks of the slavery regime-degradation,
dishonor, and social, political, and economic isolation-are reflected
in our contemporary landscape, taking the form of enduring racial
1 See Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring) (noting in the
defamation context that "[t]he right of a man to the protection of his own reputation from un-
justified invasion and wrongful hurt reflects no more than our basic concept of the essential
dignity and worth of every human being"); see also Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of
Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 973 (1964) (describing the
"real nature" of a privacy complaint as an "intrusion [that] is demeaning to individuality [and]
an affront to personal dignity"). Assaults to dignity may also take the form of so-called expres-
sive harms. See Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, "Bizarre Districts," and
Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483,
485, 506-07 (1993) (defining "expressive harms" as harms that "result[] from the ideas or atti-
tudes expressed through a governmental action, rather than from the more tangible or material
consequences the action brings about").
12 MICHEL DE MONTAIGNE, Of Custom, and Not Easily Changing an Accepted Law, in THE
COMPLETE WORKS OF MONTAIGNE 77, 85 (Donald M. Frame trans., Stanford Univ. Press 1958)
(1572-1574). AsJulian Pitt-Rivers once explained:
The conflict between honour and legality is a fundamental one that persists to this day.
For to go to law for redress is to confess publicly that you have been wronged, and the
demonstration of your vulnerability places your honor in jeopardy .... Moreover, it
gives your offender the chance to humiliate you further by his attitude during all the de-
lays of court procedure, which in fact can do nothing to restore your honor but merely
advertises its plight.
JULIAN PITt-RIVERS, HONOUR AND SOCIAL STATUS 30 (1965).
13 For a discussion of the prominence of such declarations in western philosophy and the
international legal context, see infra text accompanying notes 18-31, 45-52.
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stereotypes and chronic racial disparities in health, wealth, and soci-
ety.' 4  For this reason, the struggle for acknowledgment and affir-
mance of dignity remains critical to the enterprise of substantive ra-
cial equality.
I do not mean to suggest that dignity is the be-all-end-all of the
struggle for racial justice. Indeed, there is a certain discomfort that
creeps in whenever one begins to fixate upon amorphous concepts
such as honor and dignity in the face of profound social, political,
and material inequity. Nor is this simply a matter of privileging one
discursive strategy over another. Mere utterance of magic words ad-
dressed to dignitary concerns is not my aspiration. Rather, I seek to
emphasize dignitary concerns because this approach makes relevant a
host of considerations-for example, the widespread acceptance of
destructive stereotypes, the disabling consequences of seemingly in-
nocuous subtle forms of racial bias, and the unexamined acceptance
of so-called societal discrimination-routinely thought to be "off lim-
its" in contemporary race jurisprudence. Emphasis on dignitary con-
cerns historicizes, contextualizes, and deepens the discussion. It pro-
vides us with the means of recentering our conversation on matters of
substantive racial justice, which is a welcome reprieve from the inces-
sant wrangling over the scope and contour of procedural equality
that has come to dominate contemporary race jurisprudence. 5
One might rightfully question whether dignity has independent
force, whether it adds anything meaningful to the rights discourse.
The position I advance is simply that thinking in terms of dignity al-
lows us to focus on matters of substantive racial justice, which should
14 See GLENN LOURY, THE ANATOMY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY (2002) ("Nearly a century and a
half after the destruction of the institution of slavery, and a half-century past the dawn of the
civil rights movement, social life in the United States continues to be characterized by signifi-
cant racial stratification."). For a racial comparison of socioeconomic well-being, see discussion
infra text accompanying notes 152-61.
15 Cf. Richard A. Epstein, A Rational Basis for Affirmative Action: A Shaky but Classical Lib-
eral Defense, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 2036, 2046 (2002) (describing current affirmative action policy
as placing us in an "unhappy impasse" for "[i]f we hew to traditional constitutional law doctrine,
then we mustjettison affirmative action notwithstanding its widespread support in the university
and business communities"); Daniel A. Farber, The Outmoded Debate over Affirmative Action,
82 Cal. L. Rev. 893, 893 (1994) ("The academic debate over affirmative action has become a
bitter stalemate."); Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 1709, 1766-77
(1993) (describing affirmative action as a "wellspring" of bitter debate); Samuel Issacharoff,
When Substance Mandates Procedure: Martin v. Wilks and the Rights of Vested Incumbents in
Civil Rights Consent Decrees, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 189, 252 (1992) (stating that the affirmative
action debate is "caustic and draining"); Ilhyung Lee, Race Consciousness and Minority Schol-
ars, 33 Conn. L. Rev. 535, 536 (2001) ("[M]uch of what is written about race in legal academia
can be 'dishonest, confused, ill-informed, unhelpful.'"); Kendall Thomas, Racial Justice: Moral
or Political?, 17 Nat'l Black L.J. 222, 222-23 (2003) (observing that "our national conversation
about 'race' now stands at an impasse" and that much of what passes as reasoned debate can be
reduced to a basic disagreement over whether the Constitution permits color-conscious poli-
cies).
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have been the primary focus all along. Viewing matters of racial jus-
tice from a dignitary perspective is worth doing precisely because it
makes us think about these matters differently and more deeply. It is
critical that we identify and resurrect these easily overlooked dignity
concerns, lest they be forgotten entirely, and redeploy them to rescue
an increasingly unanchored and unresponsive jurisprudence.
Focusing on dignitary matters is important for another reason.
Relational perceptions of dignity inform a great deal of our social in-
teractions, including relations that provide the means for securing
and accumulating material stability and wealth. Thus, dignity can be
understood in instrumental terms: as providing a necessary precon-
dition to economic inclusion and material empowerment.
My argument proceeds as follows. Part I begins with a discussion
of the idea of dignity, and how that idea compares with the legal con-
cept of dignity as it relates to constitutional rights and values. Part II
contains a discussion of the concept of dignity in American race rela-
tions law. Here, I argue that dignity is (and always has been) a cen-
tral area of concern in the struggle for racial justice, and that current
Supreme Court jurisprudence indulges in delusional and counterfeit
thinking when it chooses to undervalue, distort, or evade entirely
core dignitary concerns in the context of racial disputes. Further-
more, I contend that this undervaluation, distortion, and evasion has
resulted in the promulgation of precepts of racial equality unan-
chored by a coherent moral vision or theory of racialjustice. In Part
III, I suggest that there is good reason to think that the Court can re-
anchor race jurisprudence through a renewed emphasis on dignitary
concerns, given the success of this approach when addressing the
controversial matter of gay sex in Lawrence v. Texas.'6 Specifically, I
argue that Lawrence can be powerfully understood as a self-conscious
acknowledgment and affirmation by the Court of the equal humanity
and dignity of gays. In Part IV, I discuss the implications of the
Court's approach to dignity in Lawrence, and what a renewed empha-
sis on dignity might look like in the equally contentious field of
American race relations. Although I acknowledge potential concep-
tual and doctrinal problems with this approach, I nevertheless main-
tain that a renewed emphasis on dignity may provide a mechanism
that focuses the Court's attention on the true nature of racial injus-
tice and provides the Court with an anchor for its future race-based
decision making.
Before proceeding, a word about the nature of this project is in
order. Although this Article draws heavily upon the role of slavery in
the creation and elaboration of American racial pathology, one
16 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (invalidating a Texas statute criminalizing homosexual sodomy).
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should not construe this demand for an undifferentiated acknowl-
edgment of equal humanity as applicable only in the field of
black/white relations. Concepts of honor and dignity transcend ra-
cial and ethnic lines, and the salience of these concepts in the con-
struction of racial and ethnic identity is both profound and far-
reaching. I avail myself of the black/white paradigm, in large part,
because of the crucial role of black/white relations in the shaping of
American consciousness of race matters. However, the longing for
respect and acknowledgment of worthiness is a universal human de-
sire, and the argument that honor and dignity is essential to justice
should resonate within each of us.
I. DIGNITY IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL DISCOURSE:
A BRIEF OVERVIEW
A. The Idea of Dignity
The idea of dignity is arguably "the premier value underlying the
last two centuries of moral and political thought" in Western society. 8
Yet it has proven notoriously difficult to define with precision.' 9 A
common definition of dignity refers to "the quality or state of being
17 For a discussion of the importance of honor and dignity in the Latino community, see
RUTH HOROWITZ, HONOR AND THE AMERICAN DREAM: CULTURE AND IDENTITY IN A CHICANO
COMMUNITY (1983) (describing the lives of young people and their transition into adulthood in
a Chicano community). For an example of how these concepts function in certain segments of
the Asian American community, see SHIH-SHAN HENRY TSAI, THE CHINESE EXPERIENCE IN
AMERICA 165 (1986), which describes the indignity and shame experienced by Chinese immi-
grants unable to obtain employment commensurate with their education and technical skill
level, and its effects on Chinese youth, and MELFORD S. WEISS, VALLEY CITY: A CHINESE
COMMUNITY IN AMERICA 254 (1974), which quotes a Chinese anthropological subject as stating:
Our traditions give us the courage to fight the forces of injustice. In America we may be
small in numbers but we are proud of our glorious history. We were writing when the
white man was still crawling in caves. Truly, we are more civilized. I know that while my
mouth may speak English, my heart will always feel Chinese.
For a discussion of these concepts in the Native American context, see EVA MARIE GARROUTrE,
REAL INDIANS: IDENTITY AND THE SURVIVAL OF NATIVE AMERICA (2003) (examining how Indians
define their identity); PAULA MITCHELL MARKS, IN A BARREN LAND: AMERICAN INDIAN
DISPOSSESSION AND SURVIVAL 316-23 (1998) (describing the fight for tribal autonomy by
American Indians in the 1960s and 197 0s).
18 Hugo Adam Bedau, The Eighth Amendment, Human Dignity, and the Death Penalty, in THE
CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS: HUMAN DIGNITY AND AMERICAN VALUES 145, 145 (Michael J. Meyer
& William A. Parent eds., 1992) [hereinafter THE CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS].
19 See Rhonda V. Magee Andrews, The Third Reconstruction: An Alternative to Race Consciousness
and Colorblindness in Post-Slavery America, 54 ALA. L. REV. 483, 534 (2003) ("Like Potter Stewart's
characterization of obscenity in the Jacobellis case, human dignity tends to have an 'I know it
when I see it' feel; a quality of abstractness that becomes more concrete and recognizable in
specific factual scenarios." (footnotes omitted)).
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worthy, honored, or esteemed."' Dignity in this sense appears almost
conditional. A person is worthy, honored, or esteemed, perhaps un-
der certain circumstances, but there is no suggestion, at least in this
definition, that dignity inheres to the person. As Alan Gewirth writes:
[W]e may say of some person, 'He behaved with great dignity on that oc-
casion,' or 'She generally comports herself with dignity.' Such dignity is
a contingent feature of some human beings as against others; it may be
occurrently had, gained, or lost; and, depending on the context, it may
21or may not have a specifically moral beanng.
This idea of dignity is quite distinct from eighteenth-century notions
of dignity as "elevated social rank," as described by Nathan Bailey in
the first full dictionary for the English language: "Dignity is properly
represented by a lady richly cloath'd, and adorn'd ... beautified with
ornaments of gold and precious stones. The meaning is very obvi-
ous."22 This notion of dignity as grounded in social hierarchy persists
as the leading definition in Black's Law Dictionary3 and as a subsidi-
ary definition in most general dictionaries. 4
In Western philosophy, one might trace the roots of fuller, more
modern understandings of dignity to Immanuel Kant. For Kant, dig-
nity was simply another way of referring to a person's worth. 5 A per-
son's worth was understood as something independent of a person's
value or utility. Worth, according to Kant, did not rest upon virtuous
conduct or morally decent behavior. Rather, worth was understood
to refer to the capacity that each of us presumptively possesses for
such conduct or behavior. Individuals may vary in their value or util-
ity under different circumstances, but persons presumably do not
vary in their dignity or worth. 6
20 MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 324 (10th ed. 1996); see also THE AMERICAN
HERITAGE DICrIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 522 (3d ed. 1992) (defining dignity as the
"quality or state of being worthy of esteem or respect"); WORDNET 2.0 (Princeton Univ. 2003)
(defining "dignity" as "the quality of being worthy of esteem or respect"), available at http://
www.cogsci.princeton.edu/cgi-bin/webwn2.0?stage=l &word=dignity.
2 Alan Gewirth, Human Dignity as the Basis of Rights, in THE CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS, supra
note 18, at 10, 12.
NATHAN BAILEY, DICrIONARIUM BRITANNICUM (2d ed. 1736).
25 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 468 (7th ed. 1990) (defining dignity as "1. The state of being
noble; the state of being dignified. 2. An elevated title or position").
24 See MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, supra note 20, at 324 (offering as a sec-
ond definition "a: high rank, office, or position. b: a legal title of nobility or honor"); see also
THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, supra note 20, at 522 (offer-
ing, as a third definition of dignity, "[s]tateliness and formality in manner and appearance"
and, as a fourth definition of dignity, "[tjhe respect and honor associated with an important
position"); WORDNET 2.0, supra note 20 (offering as a second definition "formality in bearing
and appearance" and as a third definition "high office or rank or station").
25 IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDING FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 30, 44 (James W. Elling-
ton trans., Hackett Publ'g Co. 1983) (1785).
26 See Bedau, supra note 18, at 153 ("[D]ignity or worth is a kind of value that all human be-
ing have equally and essentially.").
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Autonomy was an essential feature of Kant's idea of dignity. 7 By
autonomy, Kant meant essentially the freedom to have and pursue
one's own ends. To deny another's autonomy through force or
fraud, to use another person without regard to his welfare or chosen
ends, is violative of that person's dignity. Every man, according Kant,
"is obligated to acknowledge, in a practical way, the dignity of human-
ity in every other man."' Importantly, autonomy means more than
simply affording formally equal opportunities to all persons. As
Amartya Sen correctly observed, taking autonomy seriously entails,
among other things, providing individuals with the capacity (includ-
ing material wherewithal) to exercise that autonomy in a meaningful
fashion. 9
Kant's views about the nature of dignity provide a window into the• 301
debate over the meaning of dignity that would span the generations.
As Judith Resnik andJulie Chi-hye Suk explain:
Some claim for dignity a categorical valence, pronouncing the worth,
value, esteem, and deference owed to all human beings and, it is occa-
sionally argued, also to animals. Some relate dignity to religious com-
mitments about the sanctity of humans, while others locate dignity in
human agreement or conflict, as an artifact of interaction rather than as
a predicate to it. For some, individual dignity is a social undertaking,
stemming from recognition of a person's identity and an acknowledg-
31
ment of an individual's connection to others as a part of a community.
In my own view, dignity can be understood in at least two impor-
tant ways. First, dignity can be understood in personal or individual-
istic terms. Personal dignity operates at the level of the individual,
and is perhaps best understood as a sense of perspective on self-worth.
To have personal dignity is to appreciate oneself sufficiently that one
would withstand pressures to lower one's self esteem. A strong sense
of perspective on self-worth often has the effect of revealing the spu-
riousness of assaults on dignity. Perspective on self-worth explains
how African Americans emerged from slavery, Jim Crow, and the
27 KANT, supra note 25, at 30, 44.
28 Id. at 132. Under this view, the practice of slavery was morally indefensible. Interestingly,
few if any moral philosophers raised this objection. See Bernard R. Boxill, Dignity, Slavery, and
the Thirteenth Amendment, in THE CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS, supra note 18, at 102, 111-12 (iden-
tifying statements made by David Hume and Immanuel Kant regarding the natural inferiority of
blacks as "racist," but concluding that "although many notable European philosophers of the
period supported, or failed to oppose, black slavery and-if we can judge from their passing
remarks-were also very likely racists, none seriously endeavored to justify slavery [for such] an
endeavor would have been doomed to obvious self-contradiction").
AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT As FREEDOM (2000).
30 Judith Resnik & Julie Chi-hye Suk, Adding Insult to Injury: Questioning the Role of Dignity in
Conceptions of Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1921, 1929 (2003) (noting that "locating" the concept
of dignity raises many questions about the "boundaries of dignity itself").
S1 Id. at 1929-30 (citations omitted).
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agonistic mid-twentieth century movement for civil rights with a sense
of dignity intact.32 The same can be said for other historically mar-
ginalized racial and ethnic groups, such as Native Americans a and
Jews.3 I refer to dignity of this type as first-order dignity.
Dignity can also be understood to operate at the level of commu-
nity. At the communal level, inclusion is the essence of dignity. To
treat another with dignity is to consider another presumptively wor-
thy of integration into community membership. Dignity, in this
sense, is universal and undifferentiated respect for social value. It is a
universal in that dignity inheres to every member of the community.
It is undifferentiated in that the forms of social respect extended
through an acknowledgment and affirmance of dignity are equal
among all community members. I refer to dignity at the communal
level as second-order dignity.
5
For one to take dignity seriously, one must be attentive to both
first- and second-order dignitary concerns. Holistic respect for dig-
32 For a different perspective, see MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., WHY WE CAN'T WAIT (1964),
reprinted in A TESTAMENT OF HOPE: THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF MARTIN LUTHER
KING, JR. 518 (James M. Washington ed., Harper & Row, 2d ed. 1991) [hereinafter A
TESTAMENT OF HOPE 2d]. King writes:
The Negro in Birmingham, like the Negro elsewhere in this nation, had been skillfully
brainwashed to the point where he accepted the white man's theory that he, as a Negro,
was inferior. He wanted to believe that he was the equal of any man; but he didn't know
where to begin or how to resist the influences that had conditioned him to take the least
line of resistance and go along with the white man's views.
Id. at 538; see also STOKELY CARMICHAEL & CHARLES V. HAMILTON, BLACK POWER: THE POLITICS
OF LIBERATION IN AMERICA 29 (1967) ("From the time black people were introduced into this
country, their condition has fostered human indignity and the denial of respect. Born into this
society today, black people begin to doubt themselves, their worth as human beings. Self-
respect becomes almost impossible.").
33 See GARROUTrE, supra note 17, at 54 (noting that, among Native Americans, having sur-
vived the European invasion "is an extraordinary achievement, and the language of blood quan-
tum [i.e., full-blooded] gives people a well-deserved means to express it."); Rennard Strickland
& William M. Strickland, Beyond the Trail of Tears: One Hundred Fifty Years of Cherokee Survival, in
CHEROKEE REMOVAL: BEFORE AND AFTER 112 (William L. Anderson ed., 1991) (noting that the
Cherokee Nation survives as the second largest Indian tribe in the United States and observing
that "[t]oday the tribe has no doubt that in another 150 years basic Cherokee values, deeply
rooted in tribal ways, will have survived").
34 See RICH COHEN, TOUGHJEWS 192 (1998) (presenting a fictionalJewish character's angry
reflection that "for people like me, who were born long after Germany was defeated, the worst
part of the Holocaust was never the dead bodies; it was the way Jewish victims were por-
trayed.... [as] waiting to be shot, looking ahead with already dead eyes .... [without] even a
faint suggestion of personality"); LEONARD FEIN, WHERE ARE WE?: THE INNER LIFE OF AMERICA'S
JEWS 72 (1988) (exhorting Holocaust survivors to remember that "[o]ur cautionary tale is more
likely to be heard, attended, if it is seen not as special pleading but as testimony" and observing
that "[w] e, the living, the survivors, and their kin, are witnesses, not victims").
35 Because second-order dignity functions at the communal level, we can imagine the forms
of respect for social value to operate both between social groups (inter-group dignity) as well as
within social groups (intra-group dignity). Although intra-group dignitary concerns are impor-
tant, the discussion of second-order dignity in this Article will focus exclusively on inter-group
dignitary concerns.
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nity of another requires that one view others as possessing not only
inherent dignity at the personal level-that is, equal humanity-but
also a presumptive social worth that makes possible sincere inclusion
and acceptance into one's own community.
B. Dignity as a Concept in Legal Discourse
Although the idea of dignity has deep roots in American constitu-
tional history,36 dignity within legal discourse is of fairly recent vin-
tage. Most commentators agree that a deep appreciation for digni-
tary concerns of individuals did not emerge in American
constitutional discourse until after World War II. Prior to this pe-
riod, the Supreme Court understood dignity interests as held mainly
38by institutions. Justice Frankfurter first employed the idea of dignity
in connection with constitutional rights in a 1942 criminal procedure
case. The case, Glasser v. United States,9 involved a federal defendant's
claim that he had been denied his right to counsel. Frankfurter dis-
agreed with the majority's categorical finding that the mere absence
of counsel constituted a per se rights violation, and in the course of his
dissenting opinion, he observed: "The guarantees of the Bill of
Rights are not abstractions. Whether their safeguards of liberty and
dignity have been infringed in a particular case depends upon the
particular circumstances ., 40 But it was Justice Murphy who offered
the earliest passionate defense of dignitary interests. In denouncing
the Court's approval of the internment of Japanese American citizens
based solely upon ancestry in Korematsu v. United States,41 Justice Mur-
phy pointed out that the use of race as a strong proxy for criminal
suspicion
has been used in support of the abhorrent and despicable treatment of
minority groups by the dictatorial tyrannies which this nation is now
36 See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (aspiring to create a social
order in which "all [m]en are created equal"); THE FEDERALIST No. 1, at 36 (Alexander Hamil-
ton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (recommending to the people of New York that the creation
of a Constitution is the "safest course for your liberty, your dignity, and your happiness"); see also
Michael J. Meyer, Introduction to THE CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS, supra note 18, at 1 (describing
the idea of dignity during the founding era).
37 See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, Human Dignity as a Constitutional Right: A Jurisprudentially Based
Inquiry into Criteria and Content, 27 How. L.J. 145, 150 (1984) (noting that the phrase "human
dignity" was first used by the Supreme Court in 1946); Resnik & Suk, supra note 30, at 1926
(claiming that "the word dignity was not used in reference to personal constitutional rights in
the Supreme Court's jurisprudence until the 1940s in the wake of World War II").
See Resnik & Suk, supra note 30, at 1933-34 (observing Court acknowledgment of the dig-
nitary interests of "nations, states, legal institutions, personages such as judges, the flag, and
even God" (citations omitted)).
39 315 U.S. 60 (1942).
40 Id. at 89 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
41 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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pledged to destroy. To give constitutional sanction to that inference in
this case... is to adopt one of the cruelest of the rationales used by our
enemies to destroy the dignity of the individual and to encourage and
open the door to discriminatory actions against other minority groups in
42the passions of tomorrow.
Two years later, Justice Murphy would again employ the term
"human dignity" in a dissenting opinion in In re Yamashita.4, Yama-
shita involved the prosecution of a former Japanese Army General for
war crimes committed during World War II. The majority ruled that
General Yamashita was not entitled to the full panoply of rights pro-
tections generally afforded to criminal defendants. Justice Murphy,
however, believed that human dignity demanded greater attention to
the process of law: "If we are ever to develop an orderly international
community based upon a recognition of human dignity it is of the
utmost importance that the necessary punishment of those guilty of
atrocities be as free as possible from the ugly stigma of revenge and
vindictiveness.""
Some commentators have implied that Justice Murphy may have
been responding to the United Nations Charter, signed into exis-
tence just seven months earlier, which affirmed in the preamble an
"45international belief in "the dignity and worth of the human person.
Today, explicit recognition and affirmance of human dignity in law is
far more common outside American law. For instance, the United
Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights states unequivocally
that "the inherent dignity" and "equal and inalienable rights" of all is
"the foundation of freedom, justice and peace." 6  Article I of the
German Constitution also speaks directly to the protection of dignity:
"The dignity of man is inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be
the duty of all public authority., 47 The new South African Constitu-
tion declares explicitly that the founding values of new society in-
clude "[h]uman dignity, the achievement of equality and the ad-
42 Id. at 240 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
43 327 U.S. 1 (1946).
Id. at 29 (MurphyJ, dissenting).
45 U.N. CHARTER pmbl.; see also Paust, supra note 37, at 151 (assuming Murphy's awareness of
the U.N. Charter provisions, but rejecting the conclusion that "the birth of the constitutional
concept of human dignity is tied to the United [Nations] Charter").
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights pmbl., G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N. Doc A/810, at
71(1948).
47 GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] art. I (F.R.G.) (entitled "Protection of Human Dig-
nity" ) . The Human Dignity Clause of the German Constitution is thought to be *'o]f primary
importance .... In the view of the Federal Constitutional Court' this clause expresses the high-
est value of the Basic Law' informing the substance and spirit of the entire document." DONALD
P. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 298
(2d ed. 1997).
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vancement of human rights and freedoms."4 8 The Constitutions of
various South American countries-Brazil, Costa Rica, and Nicara-
gua, for example-offer similar proclamations.
In other countries, dignitary concerns have been simply "treated"
as matters of constitutional importance. For instance, in Canada,
where the Constitution contains no specific reference to dignity, the
Canadian Supreme Court has held that the genesis of the rights and
freedoms in the Canadian Charter, and the Charter itself, "are inex-
tricably tied to the concept of human dignity."50 Similarly, Israel,
which does not have a single constitutional document, nevertheless
enacted a "Basic Law of Human Dignity" in 1992 which purports to
make dignitary concerns a matter of constitutional importance."'
By contrast, dignitary discourse in American law survives largely
through judicial efforts to locate dignity as an inherent value in the
U.S. Constitution. Justice Brennan was perhaps the strongest propo-
nent of dignity as a fundamental constitutional value. According to
Justice Brennan, "the Constitution is a sublime oration on the dignity
of man, a bold commitment by a people to the ideal of a libertarian
dignity protected through law. ,53 For Brennan, the Constitution em-
48 S. AFR. CONST. § 1. For an interesting discussion of how dignitary harms have been incor-
porated into antidiscrimination law under the new South African Constitution, see Frank I.
Michelman, Reasonable Umbrage: Race and Constitutional Antidiscrimination Law in the United States
and South Africa, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1378 (2004).
49 See BRAz. CONST. tit. 1, art. 1 ("The Federative Republic of Brazil, formed by the indis-
soluble union of the states and municipalities and of the Federal District, is a legal democratic
state and is founded on ... the dignity of the human person"); COSTA RICA CONST. tit. 4, art. 33
(amended 1968) ("All persons are equal before the law and no discrimination may be made
against human dignity"); NICAR. CONST. tit. I, art. 5 (amended 1995) ("Liberty, justice, and re-
spect for the dignity of the human person... are principles of the Nicaraguan nation.").
50 R. v. Morgentaler [1988] S.C.R. 30, 164 (Can.); see also Arthur Chaskalson, Human Dignity
as a Foundational Value of Our Constitutional Order, 16 S. AFR.J. HUM. RTS. 193, 197-98 (2000) (re-
ferring to several countries' interpretation of dignity in their fundamental law).
51 See Aeyal M. Gross, The Politics of Rights in Israeli Constitutional Law, 3 ISR. STUD. 80, 88
(1998) (discussing Israeli constitutional history and the background to the 1992 Basic Laws).
52 Brennan, of course, is not the only source for developing a meaningful concept of dignity
in the law. Ronald Dworkin, for instance, has argued that moral dignity-based restraints on leg-
islation are inherent in the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Constitution. A
society that takes dignity seriously becomes more deeply democratic, according to Dworkin, be-
cause such a society "encourages each individual to suppose that his relations with other citizens
and with his government are matters ofjustice." RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 32
(1985); see also id. at 302 ("[N]o one in our society should suffer because he is a member of a
group thought less worthy of respect, as a group, than other groups.").
Similarly, philosopher Charles Taylor has suggested that the concepts of equal humanity and
dignity are essential to the creation of a democratic society: "Democracy has ushered in a poli-
tics of equal recognition, which has taken various forms over the years, and has now returned in
the form of demands for the equal status of cultures and of genders." Charles Taylor, The Poli-
tics of Recognition, in MULTICULTURALISM: EXAMINING THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION 25, 27
(Amy Gutmann ed., 1994).
53 Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., Address, Construing the Constitution, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 2,
8 (1985).
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bodied a commitment to democracy premised upon the acknowl-
edged worth of each individual member of the democratic commu-
nity. Rights protections and concomitant limitations on government
authority are rooted in a respect for individual autonomy. Thus, in
Brennan's view, the Constitution "augmented by the Bill of Rights
and the Civil War Amendments... is a sparkling vision of the su-
premacy of the human dignity of every individual. ,
The Court has, from time to time, invoked the legal concept of
dignity when analyzing Fourth Amendment protections against
unlawful searches and seizures," Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amend-
ment antidiscrimination claims,56 and Ninth and Fourteenth Amend-
ment issues involving women's reproductive rights. 7 However, dig-
nity as a legal concept has figured most prominently in the
development of the Court's modern Eighth Amendment jurispru-
dence. Justice Brennan offered his most powerful statements on the
importance of human dignity when confronting the issue whether
criminal death sentences are barred by the Cruel and Unusual Pun-
ishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment. In Furman v. Georgia,
Brennan explained: "The primary principle [advanced by the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment] is that
54 Id.
55 See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966) (declaring that the "overriding func-
tion of the Fourth Amendment is to protect personal privacy and dignity against unwanted in-
trusion by the State"); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 198 (1947) (JacksonJ., dissenting)
(arguing that dignitary interests inherent in the Fourth Amendment necessitate some limitation
on the scope of searches of homes to ensure "that decent privacy of home, papers and effects
which is indispensable to individual dignity and self respect"). The Court continues to view
dignitary interests as central to its analysis of the appropriateness of a search. See, e.g., United
States v. Flores-Montano, 124 S. Ct. 1582, 1585 (2004) (observing that "the reasons that might
support a requirement of some level of suspicion in the case of highly intrusive searches of the
person-dignity and privacy interests of the person being searched-simply do not carry over to
vehicles"); Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 303 (1999) (noting that "the degree of intru-
siveness upon personal privacy and indeed even personal dignity" of a search varies, depending
upon the circumstances); Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 23 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (argu-
ing that "[t]he offense to the dignity of the citizen who is arrested, handcuffed, and searched
on a public street simply because some bureaucrat has failed to maintain an accurate computer
data base strikes me as... outrageous"). For a discussion involving the intersection of dignity,
race, and search and seizure law, see United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976), and
discussion infra text accompanying notes 131-35. For a discussion of dignity in the context of
privacy interests of individuals who practice gay sex, see Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003),
and infra text accompanying notes 168-84.
56 See discussion infra text accompanying notes 88-147.
57 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (declaring that "[t]hese
matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime,
choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment"); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 499 (1965) (Goldberg, J.,
concurring) (stating that "the right of privacy in the marital relation is fundamental and basic-
a personal right 'retained by the people' within the meaning of the Ninth Amendment [and]
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment from infringement by the States").
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a punishment must not be so severe as to be degrading to the dignity
of human beings. 58  State-sanctioned punishments of individuals
must be carried out "with respect for their intrinsic worth as human
beings."5 9 Quite simply, a punishment is prohibited as "cruel and un-
usual" within the meaning of the Constitution if it "does not comport
with human dignity."w For Brennan, "death stands condemned as fa-
tally offensive to human dignity."
6 1
Although Brennan would become the most salient voice of human
dignity in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, he was not the firstJus-
tice to invoke the concept. In Trop v. DulLes, Chief Justice Earl War-
ren announced his belief that "[t]he basic concept underlying the
Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man., 62 Inter-
estingly, Warren expressed strong reservations that the death penalty
ran afoul of the dignitary interest inherent in the Eighth Amend-
ment. Indeed, he "put to one side the death penalty as an index of
the constitutional limit on punishment," noting that "the death pen-
alty has been employed throughout our history, and, in a day when it
is still widely accepted, it cannot be said to violate the constitutional
concept of cruelty."63  Nevertheless, Brennan's concurrence in
Furman can be read as an expansion of Warren's concept of dignity
into what Brennan would later describe as the principle "that even
the most base criminal remains a human being possessed of some po-
tential, at least, for common human dignity."
64
Scholars generally agree that dignity has and continues to func-
tion as an important constitutional value. 5 However, there remains
408 U.S. 238, 271 (1972) (Brennan,J., concurring).
5 Id. at 270.
6 Id.
61 Id. at 305.
62 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958).
6 Id. at 99.
Brennan, supra note 53, at 13. Respect for human dignity in the punishment context
would later inform the Court's view that conditions of confinement that deprive inmates of
.minimal civilized measures of life's necessities" are similarly violative of the dignitary interests
inherent in the Eighth Amendment. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981) (hold-
ing that deprivations of privileges do not violate the Eighth Amendment); see also Wilson v.
Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 296-302 (1991) (discussing genealogy of condition of confinement cases);
Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986) (observing that the Eighth Amendment prohibits
the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain" in an incarceration setting); Estelle v. Gamble,
429 U.S. 97, 102-03 (1976) (holding that deliberate indifference to an inmate's medical condi-
tion and the withholding of treatment runs afoul of the "broad and idealistic concepts of dig-
nity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency" embodied in the Eighth Amendment).
But see Raoul Berger, Justice Brennan, "Human Dignity," and Constitutional Interpretation, in
THE CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS, supra note 18, at 129. According to Professor Berger, "[riespect
for 'human dignity' clearly is spun out of thin air; it is an evangelistic exhortation rather than a
constitutional mandate." Id. at 134. A self-proclaimed originalist, Professor Berger maintains
that "English and early American law cared not a whit for 'human dignity.'" Id. at 132. Justice
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some disagreement as to what sorts of meanings might be ascribed to
dignity as a legal concept,66 and whether it adds anything of impor-
tance to the rights protections themselves.67 Even Justice Brennan,
who implored each of us to engage in the "ceaseless pursuit of the
constitutional ideal of human dignity," acknowledged that dignity
possesses a certain amount of conceptual imprecision. 68 But he did
not view such dynamism as necessarily problematic. As Brennan re-
marked:
I do not mean to suggest that we have in the last quarter century
achieved a comprehensive definition of the constitutional ideal of human
dignity. We are still striving toward that goal, and doubtless it will be an
eternal quest.... [T]he demands of human dignity will never cease to
evolve.69
Dignity, like the constitutional values of freedom and equality, takes
shape against the backdrop of changing social, political, and eco-
nomic realities. Like freedom and equality, the conceptual elasticity
of dignity does not suggest that it is devoid of content. Rather, it sug-
gests core content that continues to emerge and evolve over time.
And as Brennan correctly observed, the ability to refine the constitu-
tional values over time is "the true interpretive genius of the text."70
II. DIGNITY IN AMERICAN RACE RELATIONS LAW
The concepts of race and dignity have always shared a relationship
in American cultural consciousness, although that relationship has
transformed and grown increasingly complex over the centuries.
What follows is a discussion of the ways in which legal actors and insti-
tutions have understood and interpreted this relationship, and the
effects that this has had on the development of contemporary race
jurisprudence.
Brennan's location of dignity within the Constitution, he argues, is a "judicial fabrication[]
without constitutional warrant." Id. at 133-34.
See William A. Parent, Constitutional Values and Human Dignity, in THE CONSTITUTION OF
RIGHTS, supra note 18, at 48-50 (observing that the Court's deployment of dignity has lacked
logical and philosophical coherence, and advancing an alternative conception of human dig-
nity rooted in law); Paust, supra note 37, at 155-58 (observing that the Supreme Court has in-
voked "dignity" in a multitude of contexts, often in an inconsistent manner).
67 Resnik & Suk, supra note 30, at 1937 (suggesting that dignity is "not a distinct concept but
derives from and is a form of autonomy").
68 Brennan, supra note 53, at 12.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 14.
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A. Dignity and the Law of Slavery
Dignitary and stigmatic harms were the hallmark of the slavery re-
gime. Plantation society was an honor society and it was well under-
stood by whites that slaves, by definition, had no honor.7 The fun-
damental unworthiness of slaves was confirmed in the minds of
Southerners by what they perceived as the inability of slaves to con-
front death without fear. Southern gentlemen were not afraid to die;
mastery over the fear of death was seen as a precondition of being a
free man.72 Not surprisingly, it was an axiom of plantation society
that a slave deserved a life of humiliation for having refused an hon-
orable death.73
Violence inflicted upon slaves further reinforced white honor and
black dishonor in the eyes of Southern whites. Violence reinforced
the idea of slaves as social pariahs--outsiders "cut off from society,
making slavery itself a form of social death."v4 Scars from the lash, in
addition to presumptive stigma derived from dark skin, provided
immediate proof of the assault on Negro dignity. As historian Ken-
neth Greenberg describes, "[t]he scar, in a sense, spoke for itself-or
rather spoke about the man whose body carried it-regardless of the
process or the larger set of relations that brought it into existence."75
The root indignity of white superiority and black inferiority occa-
sionally resulted in the oppression of whites who, in defiance of pre-
vailing associational norms, chose to closely intertwine their lives with
dishonored slaves. For example, a 1664 Maryland statute provided
that "freeborne English women forgettfull of their free Condic6n and
to the disgrace of our Nation [who] intermarry with Negro
Slaues... shall Serue the master of such slaue dureing the life of her
husband [a] nd that all the Issue of such freeborne woemen soe mar-
ryed shall be Slaues as their fathers were .... "7 The stigma of the
degraded and dishonored slave was understood to have irredeemably
tainted such a woman, and so she suffered the core indignity of per-
manent estrangement from her presumptively privileged place in so-
71 See KENNETH S. GREENBERG, HONOR & SLAVERY xii (1996) (observing the close connection
between the Southern code of honor and the slavery regime); WATT-BROWN, supra note 10, at
46 (noting that slaves were incapable of subscribing to the Southern code of honor); Andrew E.
Taslitz, Hate Crimes, Free Speech, and the Contract of Mutual Indifference, 80 B.U. L. REV. 1283, 1317
(2000) (observing that "Southern whites defined slaves as persons without honor").
72 Taslitz, supra note 71, at 1320.
73 GREENBERG, supra note 71, at 109-10.
74 JAMES OAKES, SLAVERY AND FREEDOM: AN INTERPRETATION OF THE OLD SOUTH 4 (1990).
75 GREENBERG, supra note 71, at 16.
76 1 ARCHIVES OF MARYLAND: PROCEEDINGS AND ACTS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF
MARYLAND 533-34 (William Hand Browne ed., 1883).
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ciety. As historian Kathleen Brown concluded, such laws "impart[ed]
to black sexuality the power to taint.",
77
Denigration and dishonor were critical to the maintenance of the
slavery regime, even in court proceedings in which slave status or ra-
cial identity itself was the issue being contested. As Ariela Gross re-
counts:
When a person of color whose racial identity was at issue in the lawsuit
presented himself to the jury for 'inspection,' turning in all directions,
taking off his shoes for examination of his feet, opening his mouth to re-
veal his teeth, removing his shirt, showing his fingernails, he re-enacted
the shaming rituals of the slavemarket, the rites that so many ex-slaves
remembered as the defining moment of enslavement. 78
Other courtroom protocol, such as the general prohibition on
slave testimony in open court because of a presumptive lack of integ-
rity and honor, served to reinscribe this root indignity of white supe-
riority and black inferiority.79 As Gross explains, "[t]he dishonor of
the slave was a lesson that had to be taught and re-taught, and the
courtroom was one of the most public, official places where this les-
son was driven home."80
In this way, slavery allowed for what sociologist Orlando Patterson
describes as "the permanent, violent domination of natally alienated
and generally dishonored persons. ".. In the Southern plantation
ethos, the white master derived honor and status from the limitless
power over the slave, whose denigrated and dishonored social status
was wholly defined in terms of complete and utter domination. As
Judge Ruffin famously proclaimed in State v. Mann, "[t] he power of
the master must be absolute, to render the submission of the slave per-
fect."
82
Dishonor and degradation-inscribed in the Constitution's simul-
taneous embrace of the principles of freedom and equaliV and of the
institution of slavery and the trafficking of human cargo, reinforced
77 KATHLEEN M. BROWN, GOOD WivEs, NASTY WENCHES, AND ANXIOUS PATRIARCHS: GENDER,
RACE AND POWER IN COLONIAL VIRGINIA 201 (1996).
78 Ariela Gross, Essay, Beyond Black and White: Cultural Approaches to Race and Slavery, 101
COLUM. L. REV. 640, 652 (2001).
79 William W. Fisher, III, Ideology and Imagery in the Law of Slavery, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1051,
1077 (1993).
80 Gross, supra note 78, at 652.
81 ORLANDO PATrERSON, SLAVERYAND SoCIAL DEATH 13 (1982).
13 N.C. (2 Dev.) 263, 266 (1829) (emphasis added) (reversing the conviction of a white
man for assaulting and battering a slave). The court further observed that "[t]he slave, to re-
main a slave, must be made sensible, that there is no appeal from his master." Id. at 267.83.Compare U.S. CONST. pmbl. ("We the people of the United States, in Order to ... secure
the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitu-
tion .... ."), with id. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (counting Negro slaves as three-fifths of one person for po-
litical representation purposes), id. art. I, § 9, cl. 1 (allowing for the importation and federal
taxing of slave labor until 1808), id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3 (creating a constitutional right to the re-
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by infamous rulings in cases such as State v. Mann and Dred Scott v.
Sanford 4-allowed the presumption of race-based dishonor and deg-
radation to become deeply rooted in the hearts and minds of whites.
As an oft-quoted passage from Alexis de Tocqueville's Democracy in
America suggests,
The tradition of slavery dishonours the race ....
•.. [I]n those parts of the Union in which the negroes are no longer
slaves, they have in nowise drawn nearer to whites. On the contrary, the
prejudice of the race appears to be stronger in the States which have
abolished slavery than in those where it still exists; and nowhere is it so
intolerant as in those States where servitude has never been known8 5
B. Dignity and Reconstruction
The Reconstruction Amendments, of course, directly repudiated
Justice Taney's declaration in Dred Scott that blacks could not be citi-
zens because they were widely regarded by whites as "beings of an in-
ferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with the white race."0
6
Indeed, as others routinely point out, the repudiation of Justice
Taney via the Fourteenth Amendment was done in a manner that
would grant Congress, in the words of one commentator, substantial
enforcement power
to enact certain laws designed to affirm that blacks were equal citizens,
worthy of respect and dignity. Such laws ... could regulate larger non-
governmental systems of exclusion in places such as hotels, theaters, and
trains. Such laws could also seek to protect blacks from racially motivated
violence, and thereby affirm that blacks did indeed have rights that white
men (and not merely governments) were bound to respect.
The dignitary interests attended to by the Reconstruction
Amendments were openly acknowledged and affirmed in the Court's
first interpretation of those Amendments in the Slaughter-House
turn of fugitive slaves), and id. art. V (prohibiting amendment of the slave importation and
taxation provision of the Constitution prior to 1808). As former presidentJohn Quincy Adams
famously explained, "Circumlocutions are the fig leaves under which these parts of the body
politic are decently concealed." JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, ARGUMENT OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS,
BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, IN THE CASE OF THE UNITED STATES,
APPELLANTS, VS. CINQUE, AND OTHERS, AFRICANS, CAPTURED IN THE SCHOONER AMISTAD 39 (Ne-
gro Univ. Press 1969) (1841).
84 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407 (1857) (declaring that blacks could not be citizens because
they were inferior and possessed "no rights which the white man was bound to respect," and
that a black was justifiably reduced to slavery "for his [own] benefit").
85 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, 1 DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 381-83 (Henry Reeve trans., D. Ap-
pleton & Co. 1904) (1832).
86 Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 407.
87 Amar, supra note 6, at 105.
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Cases.ss Justice Miller, writing for the majority, stated unequivocally
that the Reconstruction Amendments should be interpreted in light
of their overriding purpose: "the freedom of the slave race, the secu-
rity and firm establishment of that freedom, and the protection of the
newly-made freeman and citizen from the oppressions of those who
had formerly exercised unlimited dominion over him." 9 The Court
reiterated this sentiment eight years later in Strauder v. West Virginia.9°
Justice Strong, in striking down a West Virginia statute that systemati-
cally excluded black jurors from participation in trials, addressed the
twin dignitary concerns of self-worth and social value with surprising
candor:
The very fact that colored people are singled out and expressly denied by
a statute all right to participate in the administration of the law, as jurors,
because of their color, though they are citizens, and may be in other re-
spects fully qualified, is practically a brand upon them, affixed by law, an
assertion of their inferiority, and a stimulant to the race prejudice which
is an impediment to securing to individuals of the race that equal justice
which the law aims to secure to all others. 91
C. Jim Crow and Beyond
If law and legal institutions during the Reconstruction era can be
viewed as sensitive (indeed responsive) to the dignitary harms in-
flicted by slavery through an acknowledgment and affirmance of
black humanity and social value, then the first half of the twentieth
century is best understood as a retrograde period in which law re-
sumed the work of racial denigration and dishonor through the rein-
scription of the root indignity of privileging whiteness above all oth-
ers. Justice Brown's opinion in Plessy v. Ferguson 9 2 was a clarion call to
unreconstructed racists everywhere that a policy of racial separation
and oppression could be legally justified as a reasonable race distinc-• 93
tion, consistent with the "established usages, customs and traditions"
of plantation society. 94 However, events during and immediately fol-
ss 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
89 Id. at 71.
90 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
91 Id. at 308.
92 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
93 See id. at 544 ("[T]he amendment... could not have been intended to abolish distinc-
tions based upon color, or to enforce social, as distinguished from political, equality, or a com-
mingling of the two races upon terms unsatisfactory to either.").
Id. at 550. For a discussion of the explosion in segregation laws across the country follow-
ing the Court's decision in P/essy, see THE ORIGINS OF SEGREGATION (Joel Williamson ed., 1968)
(giving different accounts of the genesis and roots of segregation); C. VANN WOODWARD,
ORIGINS OF THE NEW SOUTH 1877-1913, 211 (Wendell Holmes Stephenson & E. Merton Coul-
ter eds., 1951) ("It took a lot of ritual andJim Crow to bolster the creed of white supremacy in
the bosom of a white man working for a black man's wages"); C. VANN WOODWARD, THE
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lowing Reconstruction suggest the deep-seated aversion to acknowl-
edging the essential self-worth and social value of newly emancipated
slaves had never fully abated.
Perhaps the earliest expression of this post-Civil War sentiment
occurred in March 1886, in President Andrew Johnson's Veto Mes-
sage to Congress denouncing the proposed Civil Rights Bill.95 For,
Johnson, immediate bestowal of citizenship upon newly emancipated
blacks, when presumably white "intelligent, worthy, and patriotic for-
eigners'9 6 were required to proceed through standard immigration
procedures, was an outrageous proposition because the colorline was
now "made to operate in favor of the colored and against the white
race."97 Rather than securing dignity via citizenship for the freedman,
Johnson argued that the bill would serve only "to resuscitate the spirit
of rebellion, and to arrest the progress" made thus far. 9
This sentiment would eventually gain voice in the Supreme
Court's developing equality jurisprudence. Perhaps the best judicial
expression of the hesitancy to take the dignity of newly emancipated
blacks seriously prior to its repudiation of such concerns in Plessy v.
Ferguson appears in Justice Bradley's majority opinion in the Civil
Rights Cases. In striking down legislation designed to provide equal
access to public accommodations, Justice Bradley rejected the idea
that the struggle for racial justice should demand that attention be
paid to the indignity occasioned by entrenched social inequality. As
Justice Bradley explained:
When a man has emerged from slavery, and by the aid of beneficent leg-
islation has shaken off the inseparable concomitants of that state, there
STRANGE CAREER OFJIM CROW 97-109 (3d ed. 1974) (noting the spread of Jim Crow laws both
before and after Plessy, which had the effect of "constantly pushing the Negro farther down");
see also RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 57 (2001) (noting that "in
the wake of Plessy, legally mandated race-based segregation had suffused the social and political
fabric of many states, especially in the South"). But see MICHAELJ. KLARMAN, FROMJIM CROW TO
CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 48 (2004) (con-
cluding that "[t]he spread of segregation to new social contexts is also more plausibly attribut-
able to factors other than Pessy" and noting that "white southerners generally codified their
racial preferences first and tested judicial receptivity later").
95 Andrew Johnson, Veto of the Civil Rights Bill, March 27, 1866, in THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DURING THE PERIOD OF RECONSTRUCTION 74-78 (1871).
96 Id. at 75.
97 Id. at 78 (emphasis added).
98 Id. For a discussion of the evolution and legacy of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, see Chris-
topher A. Bracey, The Civil Rights Act of 1866, in MAJOR ACTS OF CONGRESS 93-99 (Brian K.
Landsberg ed., 2003). For a discussion of the Act in the context of reconstruction efforts, see
generally W.E.B. Du Bois, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA (Atheneum 1975) (1935) (dis-
cussing how Reconstruction affected black Americans from 1860 to 1880); ERIC FONER,
RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863-1877 (1988) (discussing how Re-
construction changed America); HAROLD M. HYMAN & WILLIAM M. WIECEK, EQUAL JUSTICE
UNDER LAW: CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 1835-1875 (1982).
109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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must be some stage in the progress of his elevation when he takes the
rank of a mere citizen, and ceases to be the special favorite of the laws,
and when his rights as a citizen, or a man, are to be protected in the or-
dinary modes by which other men's rights are protected. °°
Justice Harlan's response to Bradley on this point put the dignitary
interests of blacks front and center. In Harlan's view, blacks had
never been the favorite of the law."°" More importantly, the principle
struggle up to this time was getting whites to acknowledge the essen-
tial worthiness of blacks as co-equal citizens. According to Harlan:
"The difficulty has been to compel a recognition [by whites] of [the
black race's] legal right to take [the] rank [of citizens] .... ,,102 Fur-
thermore, Harlan acknowledges that the dignitary interest sought by
blacks was, at bottom, one of inclusion and social value. Thus,
Harlan reiterates that the signal of inclusion sent by legislating access
to public accommodations is of critical importance because it "se-
cure[s] the enjoyment of privileges belonging, under the law, to
them as a component part of the people for whose welfare and happiness gov-
ernment is ordained."
Against this backdrop, the Court's decision in Plessy can be under-
stood as the wholesale eschewal of the dignitary interests of blacks,
accomplished by the subversion of the Reconstruction Amendments'
mandate for substantive racial equality, and corresponding embrace
of segregationist policy premised upon the unreconstructed values of
the slavery regime. The Plessy Court not only sanctioned radical ine-
quality; it audaciously declared that any perception that such policy
was intended to disrespect or denigrate blacks was imaginary. Ac-
cording to the Court, race distinctions themselves do not create a
badge of inferiority-if such a badge exists, "it is not by reason of any-
thing found in the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to
put that construction upon it."1 4 In this way racial dishonor and in-
dignity were reinscribed through law, which simultaneously refused
to acknowledge the pernicious nature of this enterprise. Thus, as so-
ciologist Gilbert Stephenson, writing in 1910, observed, notions of ra-
cial dishonor and stigma rooted in slavery and reinscribed in Jim
Crow legislation flourished in myriad sectors of twentieth-century
American life, distorting perceptions of worthiness of citizenship and
co-equal participation in civil society.' °
100 Id. at 25.
101 Id. at 61 (Harlan,J., dissenting).
:02 Id. (emphasis added).
103 Id. (emphasis added).
1G4 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896).
105 See GILBERT THOMAS STEPHENSON, RACE DISTINCTIONS IN AMERICAN LAw 254 (1910) (sec-
ond alteration in original) (quoting an Arkansas county clerk of court's explanation that blacks
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This process of reinscription and disavowal became the hallmark
of early twentieth-century race cases. Cases such as Gong Lum v.
Rice,'06 Ozawa v. United States,0 7 and United States v. Thind°8 reveal that
this tendency extended well beyond the traditional black/white
paradigm. Gong Lum v. Rice involved a petition submitted by nine-
year-old Martha Lum, a Chinese American girl, for permission to at-
tend an all-white primary school in Mississippi. At the time, section
207 of the Mississippi Constitution provided that "[s] eparate schools
shall be maintained for children of the white and colored races." '°9
The girl's father, Gong Lum, did not wish to challenge the doctrine
of separate but equal, but rather sought inclusion in the racial cate-
gory of "white" to the extent that it operates in the realm of public
schooling. The stakes of inclusion were simple for Gong Lum-he
wanted his child to go to the better funded school and presumably
preferred to associate with and possibly assimilate into the dominant
(as opposed to the marginal) American culture.
From the Court's perspective, however, inclusion of Asians within
the categorical scheme of whiteness was deeply problematic because
it would necessarily entail endorsement, to some extent, of the idea
of social and political equality among the races. The acknowledg-
ment and affirmance of the essential dignity of Asians ran up against
core notions of white cultural superiority.' ° Moreover, granting in-
clusion into the category of white for purposes of public education
would expose the lie of separate but equal-for if the schools were
equal, then Gong Lum presumably would have been indifferent as to
which school his daughter attended. Deflecting the thrust of Gong
Lum's request to be treated with dignity, the Court proclaimed, "we
[the Court] think that [Gong Lum's challenge] is the same question
which has been many times decided to be within the constitutional
are routinely barred from serving as jurors because "[c ] olored jurors [are] not looked upon as
intelligent, and very few as honest and possessing integrity").
106 275 U.S. 78 (1927).
107 260 U.S. 178 (1922).
108 261 U.S. 204 (1923).
109 Gong Lum, 275 U.S. at 82 (quoting MISS. CONST. art. VIII, § 207 (repealed 1978)).
110 Cf Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 561 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan
described the Chinese as "a race so different from our own that we do not permit those belong-
ing to it to become citizens of the United States" and expressed outrage that
[A] Chinaman can ride in the same passenger coach with white citizens ... while citizens
of the black race.., many of whom, perhaps, risked their lives for the preservation of
the Union .... who are not excluded, by law or by reason of their race, from public sta-
tions of any kind, and who have all the legal rights that belong to white citizens, are yet
declared to be criminals ... if they ride in a public coach occupied by citizens of the
white race.
Id.; see also LOTHROP STODDARD, THE RISING TIDE OF COLOR AGAINST WHITE WORLD-SUPREMACY
299-307 (1920) (decrying the corrosive effects associated with the mixing of white and "Asiatic
blood," including "the collapse of civilization").
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power of the state legislature.. 11. The effect of the Court's ruling was
to rest Gong Lum's fate in the hands of a demonstrably racist Missis-
sippi legislature. In this way, the Court's decision in Gong Lum served
to reinscribe the root indignity of white supremacy by reinterpreting
the doctrine of separate but equal to mean not only separation of
whites from blacks, but separation of whites from every other race in
American society.
The Court's championing of white supremacist values and deni-
gration of other races was likewise reflected in naturalization cases.
In Ozawa v. United States, a man of Japanese ancestry applied to the
District Court of Hawaii to be admitted as a citizen. At the time, the
Naturalization Act of 1906 appeared to limit naturalization to whites
and persons of African descent."2 Nevertheless, Ozawa argued that
he should be allowed to be naturalized because: (1) he had resided
in Hawaii for twenty years; (2) he was schooled in the United States;
(3) he had educated his children in the United States; (4) he had at-
tended American churches; and (5) he spoke English in his home.
'3
At trial, Ozawa emphasized the extent of his assimilation and es-
chewal of Japanese culture. Indeed, during oral argument, Ozawa's
attorney emphasized the whiteness of Ozawa's skin. 1The Ozawa
Court conceded that Ozawa was well qualified for citizenship in terms
of character and education."5 However, the Court rejected Ozawa's
petition for citizenship. Despite the absence of an express prohibi-
tion on Asian naturalization in the statute, the Court nevertheless
concluded that Asians were presumptively barred. According to the
Court, Congress would have clearly indicated its desire to allow Asians
to naturalize if it really intended to do so. The Court interpreted the
term "white" in the naturalization statute to refer to the scientific des-
ignation "Caucasian,""16 and concluded that Ozawa, though an assimi-
lated, educated man of Japanese ancestry,"7 was not "Caucasian" and
therefore ineligible to become a citizen. As it had done twenty-five
years earlier in Plessy, the Court evaded the dignitary interests of
Ozawa, stating that "there is not implied-either in the legislation or
II GongLum, 275 U.S. at 86.
12 America's first naturalization statute restricted naturalization to "free white person [s]."
Uniform Naturalization Act of 1790, § 1, 1 Stat. 103 (repealed 1795). Following the Civil War,
Congress allowed for the naturalization of "aliens of African nativity and... persons of African
descent." Act ofJuly 14, 1870, § 7, 16 Stat. 256.
113 Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 189 (1922).
14 IAN F. HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 81 (1996) (cit-
ing petitioner's briefs).
115 Ozawa, 260 U.S. at 189.
116 Id. at 197.
117 Id. at 189.
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in our interpretation of it-any suggestion of individual unworthiness
or racial inferiority.
' 18
The Court's ruling in Ozawa would seem to have resolved the am-
biguity in the naturalization statute-naturalization under the 1906
statute was limited to white persons, defined as Caucasians, and per-
sons of African nativity. However, one year later in United States v.
Thind, the Court revisited this standard and, in so doing, ensured the
categorical exclusion of Asians from the political community. Thind
involved a naturalization petition filed by a "high-caste Hindu.""9 Al-
though Indian and born in India, Thind claimed to be a descendant
of the Aryan race. According to Thind, the genealogy of the Aryan of
India can be traced to the same source as the Aryan of Europe. Un-
der the caste system, Thind and other Aryan Indians were at the top
of the racial pecking order. The Court conceded that the term Cau-
casian, which excluded Ozawa, did not technically exclude Aryan In-
dians-that "[iit may be true that the blond Scandinavian and the
brown Hindu have a common ancestor in the dim reaches of antiq-
uity.' 120 However, the Court now claimed that the scientific meaning
ascribed to the term Caucasian was too scientific and could not have
been comprehended by the Framers, who were unfamiliar with the
term. As a consequence, the Thind Court stated that the term "white"
should be interpreted as popularly understood by the Framers and by
the proverbial "common man.".. Applying this new, unscientific rule
of racial classification, the Court summarily concluded that the term
white simply does not contemplate Indian, although it does contem-
plate Eastern, Southern, and Middle Europeans, Slavic, and Mediter-
ranean types. As the Court explained: "It is a matter of familiar ob-
servation and knowledge that the physical group characteristics of the
Hindus render them readily distinguishable from the various groups
of persons in this country commonly recognized as white.", 2 Al-
though the ruling of the Court made clear that immigrants from In-
dia are not afforded the same privileges that immigrants from Euro-
pean countries enjoy-at least in terms of availability of citizenship-
the Court once again, in the spirit of Plessy, observed that the decision
does not "suggest the slightest question of racial superiority or inferi-
ority.,,123
8 Id. at 198.
"9 United States v. Thind, 261 U.S. 204, 206 (1923).
120 Id. at 209.
'2' Id. at 214.
122 Id. at 215.
123 Id.
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D. Dignity in Modern Race Jurisprudence
In the modern era of race jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has
periodically embraced consideration of the extent to which the pur-
suit of racial justice through legal means demands acknowledgment
and confirmation of the essential dignity of persons subordinated on
the basis of race. Certain landmark cases such as Brown v. Board of
Education24 placed the issue of dignity at the forefront of the move-
ment for racial justice. Brown, after all, was far more than simply a
case involving the application of the Fourteenth Amendment to seg-
regated public education. It represented an opportunity taken by the
Court to enshrine the rights of people of color in the name of a col-
lective sense ofjustice and dignity.
Justices in subsequent cases would periodically comment upon the
centrality of dignitary concerns within the context of civil rights and
the future of American race relations. Justice Goldberg, in his con-
curring opinion in Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States,'2 highlighted
Senate conclusions that the primary purpose of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 was
"to solve this problem, the deprivation of personal dignity that surely ac-
companies denials of equal access to public establishments. Discrimina-
tion is not simply dollars and cents, hamburgers and movies; it is the hu-
miliation, frustration, and embarrassment that a person must surely feel
when he is told that he is unacceptable as a member of the public be-
cause of his race or color."1
27
Under this view, public accommodations laws ensure equal access to
goods and services in order to affirm the equal dignity and worth of
previously excluded individuals.28 Justice Stevens reiterated this
theme of equal dignity in the voting rights context. In his concur-
rence in City of Mobile v. Bolden,'29justice Stevens declared that respect
for black voters entailed, among other things, that blacks and mem-
bers of other identifiable groups be permitted to "go to the polls with
124 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
125 SeeJAMES T. PATTERSON, BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION: A CIVIL RIGHTS MILESTONE AND
ITS TROUBLED LEGACY 69, 221-23 (2001) (discussing how the Brown decision had powerful sym-
bolic significance and led to a "larger rights-consciousness that deeply influenced American law
and life").
126 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
127 Id. at 291-92 (Goldberg,J., concurring) (quoting S. REP. No. 88-872, at 16 (1964)).
128 See Peter Brandon Bayer, Mutable Characteristics and the Definition of Discrimination Under
Title VII, 20 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 769, 845 (1987) (describing Title VII as "directed towards pro-
tecting the dignity, self esteem, and individuality of employees and employment applicants").
129 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
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equal dignity and with an equal right to be protected from invidious
discrimination.'130
Similarly, the Court has periodically demonstrated its awareness of
the elevated importance of dignitary concerns when dealing with
cases in which matters of race and criminal procedure are inter-
twined. For instance, in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, Justice Bren-
nan described the discriminatory targeting of Mexican Americans at
border checkpoints as an "affront to the dignity of American citizens
of Mexican ancestry and Mexican aliens." ' In Powers v. Ohio, the
Court observed that its prohibition on the use of race-based peremp-
tory strikes in jury selection announced in Batson v. Kentucky'2 served
multiple ends, including the protection of the dignity interest of in-
dividual jurors and the integrity of the courts.1 33 The Court again ac-
knowledged the nature of this dignitary harm in Georgia v. McCollum,
noting that the exclusion of a juror not only harms the dignity of the
individual juror, but of the entire community. 134 Interestingly, the
most emphatic articulation of this dignitary harm to potential jurors
was offered by Justice Blackmun, albeit in the context of gender-
based exclusion:
All persons, when granted the opportunity to serve on a jury, have the
right not to be excluded summarily because of discriminatory and stereo-
typical presumptions .... Striking individual jurors on the assumption
that they hold particular views simply because of their gender .... deni-
grates the dignity of the excluded juror, and, for a woman, reinvokes a
135history of exclusion from political participation.
More recently, however, the Court has generally chosen to elide
the question of dignity as it relates to our painful history of racial in-
justice. Discussions of dignity in modern race jurisprudence typically
take one of two forms. In some cases, dignitary interests are folded
into the concept of the colorblind ideal. In these instances, dignity is
considered only in thoroughly abstracted form, dislodged from its
130 Id. at 89 n.10 (quoting Cousins v. City Council of Chicago, 466 F.2d 830, 852 (7th Cir.
1972) (Stevens,J., dissenting)).
131 428 U.S. 543, 573 n.4 (1976). Justice Murphy expressed a similar sentiment in his dissent-
ing opinion in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 240 (1945) (Murphy, J., dissenting) (ob-
serving that the use ofJapanese ancestry as a proxy for criminal suspicion was "one of the cruel-
est of the rationales used by our enemies to destroy the dignity of the individual and to
encourage and open the door to discriminatory actions against other minority groups in the
passions of tomorrow").
132 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
3 Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 406 (1991) ("Batson recognized that a prosecutor's dis-
criminatory use of peremptory challenges harms the excluded jurors and the community at
large.").
14 505 U.S. 42, 49 (1992) ("But '[tihe harm from discriminatory jury selection extends be-
yond that inflicted on the defendant and the excluded juror to touch the entire community.'"
(citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 87)).
135 J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 141-42 (1994) (citation and footnote omitted).
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proper historical context. As a consequence, dignity is thought to be
best protected by a strong presumption against the deployment of
any racial classification. Thus, a plurality of the Court viewed the
striking down of a set-aside program for minority businesses in City of
Richmond v. JA. Croson Co. as protective of dignity, albeit the dignity
of whites."16 As Justice O'Connor wrote:
The Richmond Plan denies certain citizens the opportunity to compete
for a fixed percentage of public contracts based solely upon their race.
To whatever racial group these citizens belong, their "personal rights" to
be treated with equal dignity and respect are implicated by a rigid rule
erecting race as the sole criterion in an aspect of public decisionmak-
ing. 137
Justice O'Connor's linking of "equal dignity" and the colorblind
ideal had the effect of severing claims of affirmance of self-worth and
social value from their historical moorings. All citizens were entitled
to equal dignity without reference to accounts of past injustices. 138 It
was of little interest to the Court that the Richmond program was an
attempt at material and dignitary recompense for past racial injus-
tices. The significance of the adoption of the program in the former
capital of the Confederacy was lost on the majority.39  In this histori-
cal and contextual vacuum, all racial classifications are equally trou-
bling, and there is little, if any, principled ground upon which to sort
the good from the bad.' 40
13 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
137 Id. at 493.
13 As Professor Richard Epstein recently remarked:
One of the great ironies with the modern statement of strict scrutiny is that it erects a
color-blind norm that runs in both directions, such that.., any claim brought by a white
person against state action should be judged by the same exacting standards as any claim
brought by a black person against state action.... [But] no one could say, or at least say
honestly, that whites today are excluded from the political process as blacks had been
under segregation; nor, in light of an oft-painful racial history, is it possible to subject
raced-based polices [sic] that benefit blacks to the same full-throated denunciation as
could be brought against state-sponsored segregation.
Epstein, supra note 15, at 2045-46.
139 As Justice Marshall stated in his dissent: "It is a welcome symbol of racial progress when
the former capital of the Confederacy acts forthrightly to confront the effects of racial discrimi-
nation in its midst." Croson, 488 U.S. at 528 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
140 William Bradford Reynolds, Assistant Attorney General and head of the Civil Rights Divi-
sion of the U.S. Department of Justice during the Reagan Administration, was a particularly
strong proponent of this view. According to Reynolds, "[b]y 1981, many forces within the civil
rights movement had abandoned their moral dedication to equality for all and instead had em-
braced the concept of so-called 'benign' discrimination." William Bradford Reynolds, The
Reagan Administration's Civil Rights Policy: The Challenge for the Future, 42 VAND. L. REV. 993, 994
(1989). For Reynolds it was impossible to make benign racial classifications-affirmative action
policy was no less contemptible than the de jure segregation of years past. Id. at 995. But see
Epstein, supra note 15, at 2046 (suggesting that those who claim that affirmative action and seg-
regation laws are qualitatively indistinguishable are guilty of intellectual dishonesty).
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More importantly, the moral force of claims for equal dignity that
once defined the racial justice movement for African Americans was
deflected and funneled into the aspirational norm of colorblind-
ness. 4 1  Not surprisingly, it is also in Croson where we find Justice
Kennedy's powerfully revisionist assertion that "[t]he moral impera-
tive of racial neutrality is the driving force of the Equal Protection
Clause." '142 Justice Thomas reiterated this distorted view of the role of
dignity in equality jurisprudence in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefila,
stating that "it is irrelevant whether ... racial classifications are drawn
by those who wish to oppress a race or by those who have a sincere
desire to help those thought to be disadvantaged.' 43
141 William Bradford Reynolds was particularly forthright in his misappropriation of civil
rights movement rhetoric, and in particular the moral authority of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.
For instance, Reynolds offered this explanation for the Reagan Administration's infamous pol-
icy of weakening civil rights enforcement and opposing affirmative action:
[R]acial classifications are wrong-morally wrong-and ought not to be tolerated in any
form or for any reason.... [The] true essence [of this principle] was best captured, in
my judgment, by Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., when he dreamed aloud in the summer of
1963 of a nation in which his children would "not be judged by the color of their skin,
but by the content of their character."
William Bradford Reynolds, Individualism vs. Group Rights: The Legacy of Brown, 93 YALE L.J. 995,
1000-01 (1984). President Reagan himself, in a radio address, offered a ritual invocation of
King in defense of the Administration's policy:
We are committed to a society in which all men and women have equal opportunities to
succeed, and so we oppose the use of quotas.... We want a colorblind society. A society
that in the words of Dr. King, judges people not by the color of their skin, but by the
content of their character.
Associated Press, Reagan Quotes King Speech in Opposing Minority Quotas, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 1986,
at A20. Republican Senator Alan Simpson would later argue during the contentious confirma-
tion ofJustice Clarence Thomas that Thomas embodied the moral legacy of King. See Hearing of
the S. Judiciary Comm. on the Nomination of Clarence Thomas to the Supreme Court, 102d Cong. (1991)
(statement of Sen. Simpson) (noting that King "asked only that he and his chil-
dren... [receive] colorblind judgment, and isn't that just exactly what Judge Thomas is advo-
cating?").
Unfortunately, conservative thinkers have often failed to hear King's deeper message on the
meaning of racial justice. As King explained:
Many whites who concede that Negroes should have equal access to public facilities and
the untrammeled right to vote cannot understand that we do not intend to remain in the
basement of the economic structure; they cannot understand why a porter or a house-
maid would dare dream of a day when his work will be more useful, more remunerative
and a pathway to rising opportunity. This incomprehension is a heavy burden in our ef-
forts to win white allies for the long struggle.
MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., A Testament of Hope, PLAYBOY, Jan. 1969, at 16, reprinted in A
TESTAMENT OF HOPE 2d, supra note 32, at 313, 316. Or as King wrote in Where Do We Go From
Here.
White America was ready to demand that the Negro should be spared the lash of brutal-
ity and coarse degradation, but it had never been truly committed to helping him out of
poverty, exploitation or all forms of discrimination .... But the absence of brutality and
unregenerate evil is not the presence ofjustice.
MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE: CHAOS OR COMMUNITY? (1967), re-
printed in A TESTAMENT OF HOPE, supra note 2, at 555, 557.
142 Croson, 488 U.S. at 518 (Kennedy,J., concurring).
143 515 U.S. 200, 240 (1995) (Thomas,J, concurring).
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Dignitary interest in contemporary race jurisprudence also takes
the form of concern over the possible stigmatizing effects of being
denoted the "beneficiary" of a racial classification. Justice Stevens, in
his concurring opinion in Croson, observed that "[a]lthough [a race
preference policy] stigmatizes the disadvantaged class with the un-
proven charge of past racial discrimination, it actually imposes a greater
stigma on its supposed beneficiaries.",44 Justice Powell, in Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke, observed that "preferential programs
may only reinforce common stereotypes holding that certain groups
are unable to achieve success without special protection based on a
factor having no relationship to individual worth.' 45 Justice Kennedy,
in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, offered a similar warning: "The his-
tory of governmental reliance on race demonstrates that racial poli-
cies defended as benign often are not seen that way by the individuals
affected by them .... Special preferences.., can foster the view that
members of the favored groups are inherently less able to compete
,0146on their own.
In the Court's most recent race case-Grutter v. Bollinger-Justice
O'Connor evaded almost entirely the issue of dignity and stigma in
her opinion upholding limited race preferences in law school admis-
sions. 'Her solitary "nod" to dignitary concerns is contained in a
single sentence: "In order to cultivate a set of leaders with legitimacy
in the eyes of the citizenry, it is necessary that the path to leadership
be visibly open to talented and qualified individuals of every race and
ethnicity."' Implicit in this remark is an acknowledgment of second-
order dignity-that racial and ethnic minorities should be presump-
tively worthy of inclusion among the ranks of American leaders. Im-
portantly, the remark highlights that acknowledgment of second-
order communal dignity alone does not legitimize leadership, but it
does allow us to think about and, in Justice O'Connor's case, justify
144 Croson, 488 U.S. at 516-17 (Stevens, J. concurring) (emphasis added).
145 438 U.S. 265, 298 (1978).
146 497 U.S. 547, 635-36 (1990) (Kennedy,J., dissenting). Proponents of this view rarely seek
confirmation that such stigmatization actually occurs. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, A Case for
Race Consciousness, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 1060, 1091 (1991) ("Despite assertions by whites that race-
conscious programs 'stigmatize' beneficiaries, blacks remain overwhelmingly in favor of affirma-
tive action. Would we not expect blacks to be the first to recognize such harms and therefore to
oppose affirmative action if it produced serious stigmatic injury?") (citation omitted). However,
Derek Bok and William G. Bowen's landmark study on the beneficiaries of affirmative action
suggests quite the opposite. See WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER:
LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS
245-48, 261 (1998) (finding that an overwhelming number of affirmative action beneficiaries
thought that universities should place greater emphasis on diversity and reporting enhanced
self-confidence from having learned and competed with the best and brightest students).
147 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
148 Id. at 332.
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policies directed at achieving material changes consistent with a view
of substantive racial justice.
It is dissenting Justice Thomas who chooses to address dignity and
stigma most directly. In Brown v. Board of Education, the Court under-
stood that the dignitary harm was caused by segregation, and that the
remedy was to take affirmative steps to integrate public schools. In
Grutter, Justice Thomas turns this argument on its head, suggesting
that the dignitary harm is caused by the affirmative steps to integrate,
and that the "remedy" is to declare such affirmative steps unconstitu-
tional. As Justices Thomas writes:
The majority of blacks are admitted to the Law School because of dis-
crimination, and because of this policy all are tarred as undeserving.
This problem of stigma does not depend on determinacy as to whether
those stigmatized are actually the 'beneficiaries' of racial discrimination.
When blacks take positions in the highest places of government, industry,
or academia, it is an open question today whether their skin color played
a part in their advancement. The question itself is the stigma-because
either racial discrimination did play a role, in which case the person may
be deemed 'otherwise unqualified,' or it did not, in which case asking the
question itself unfairly marks those blacks who would succeed without
discrimination.
149
Some argue that the Court's prevailing fetish of colorblindness
and concerns about stigmatic harm to affirmative action beneficiaries
is an example of how the Court does take dignity seriously. 150 Others
maintain that dignity is perhaps best preserved by taking government
out of the business of racial regulation. 15' The problem, however, is
149 Id. at 373 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
150 See STEPHAN THERNSTROM & ABIGAIL THERNSTROM, AMERICA IN BLACK AND WHITE: ONE
NATION, INDIVISIBLE 539 (1997) ("Race-conscious policies make for more race-consciousness;
they carry American society backward."). However, a number of scholars have pointed out the
more pernicious consequences of the Court's adherence to a theory of "colorblindness." See,
e.g., Henry L. Chambers, Jr., Colorblindness, Race Neutrality and Voting Rights, 51 EMORY L.J. 1397,
1414 (2002) ("The combination of colorblindness and the intent rule appears to create a world
in which laws that unintentionally harm racial minorities because of their position in society are
presumptively valid while laws that affirmatively seek to help racial minorities attain an equal
position in society are presumptively invalid."); Barbara J. Flagg, "Was Blind, But Now I See":
White Race Consciousness and the Requirement of Discriminatoy Intent, 91 MICH. L. REv. 953, 954
(1993) ("[T~he pursuit of colorblindness progressively reveals itself to be an inadequate social
policy if the ultimate goal is substantive racial justice."); Gotanda, supra note 6, at 16 (observing
that colorblindness "fosters the systematic denial of racial subordination and the psychological
repression of an individual's recognition of that subordination, thereby allowing such subordi-
nation to continue");John E. Morrison, Colorblindness, Individuality, and Merit: An Analysis of the
Rhetoric Against Affirmative Action, 79 IOWA L. REV. 313, 358 (1994) (arguing that
"[c]olorblindness is a simple and an apparently costless way to forget the racism in American
society").
151 See, e.g., MILTON FREEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 108-18 (1962) (arguing that the
"free market" regulation of racial discrimination is preferable to government intrusion); Rich-
ard Epstein, Two Models of Civil Rights, 8 SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y 38 (1993) (arguing that an emphasis
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that both of these positions appear to focus almost entirely on first-
order personal dignity. As discussed above, a meaningful conception
of dignity entails attention to second-order communal considerations
as well. Indeed, in the context of race relations, second-order digni-
tary concerns of inclusion and community are arguably worthy of ele-
vated importance.
The transformation or outright evasion of second-order dignity in
recent years by the Court is deeply troubling precisely because it ne-
glects the principles of inclusion and community, and as such, has
left race jurisprudence unanchored to a meaningful theory of racial
justice. There is, I believe, an important relationship between dignity
and substantive racial justice. The acknowledgment and affirmance
of dignity is neither automatic nor inevitable. Rather, it entails an ac-
tive opposition and engagement with life's harshest truths. A crucial
aspect of those harsh truths is that slavery, segregation, and modem
forms of so-called societal discrimination involve extensive efforts to
degrade, dishonor, isolate, and ostracize. We see the consequences
of this reflected in enduring racial stereotypes and chronic disparities
in health, wealth, and social mobility. Importantly, these disparities
are not mere by-products of these efforts; they are the intended conse-
quences of these regimes.
A comparison of indicia of social well-being between blacks and
whites proves remarkably revealing. African Americans with the same
level of education as whites continue to earn substantially less.
52
Blacks continue to occupy proportionally fewer managerial positions
and proportionally greater service and unskilled labor positions.
153
Median family income for African Americans is roughly two-thirds
that of whites.15 4 Black youth continue to lag behind whites in per-
formance on standardized tests for mathematics and reading com-
prehension. 5  The percentage of African American children under
the age of eighteen who live in poverty is almost double that of
whites.5 6 The same is true for the number of births to unwed moth-
ers.15 Homicide victimization rates for blacks are nearly double the
rates for whites.' Incarceration rates for black men are seven times
those for white men. 59 African American adult men and women have
on freedom of contract and association provide the optimum level of civil rights protections
and respect for dignity of all).
152 LOURY, supra note 14, at 175 tbl.1.
153 Id. at 176 tbl.2.
154 Id. at 184 fig.2.
155 Id. at 180-81 tbls.6 & 7.
156 Id. at 190 fig.8.
17 Id. at 196 fig.14.
1 Id. at 200 fig.18.
159 Id. at 201 fig.19.
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a shorter life expectancy than their white counterparts, 160 with black
infant mortality rates approximately double those for whites.
16
Unlike the post-Civil War and Warren Courts, which understood
that they could not properly realize the pursuit of racial justice with-
out reference to dignitary interests, the current Court's transforma-
tion or outright evasion of the dignity inquiry has enabled it to scru-
tinize current racial classifications in a socially antiseptic
environment-one cleansed of troubling historical context and
wiped clean of any indicia of present-day racial subordination. Sin-
cere attention to dignitary concerns-respect for equal humanity and
social value-provide a mechanism to open up the possibilities of
substantive racial justice. Such attention advances substantive racial
justice because an emphasis on dignitary concerns forces us to his-
toricize, contextualize, and deepen the discussion. One cannot ac-
knowledge another's equal humanity without first interrogating the
nature of that person's humanity, as well as one's own. This entails,
among other things, a strong consideration of that person's lived ex-
perience. For African Americans, this means examining and coming
to terms with the historical and present forms of oppression that pro-
vide content to the African American racial reality.
Similarly, one cannot affirm another's presumed social value or
worthiness of inclusion into a community without first investigating
the conditions of the community that make inclusion possible. If
whites are to affirm the dignity of African Americans, a necessary pre-
condition is that whites examine critically and self-consciously not
only the effects of racial subordination on blacks, but the myriad ways
in which the culture of subordination has distorted and disfigured
majority society in general and white identities in particular. A cen-
tral problem with focusing exclusively on formal equality is that the
discourse may very well indulge the prospect of inclusion for black
Americans in an ever-expanding circle of people deserving respect,
but leaves the center of that circle tragically unexamined. Equality
extended without reference to dignity leaves unanswered the ques-
tion of what allows white Americans to see black Americans as their
presumptive inferiors in the first place.
Because an emphasis on dignity necessarily historicizes, contextu-
alizes, and deepens, it begins to make relevant a host of considera-
tions routinely thought to be "off limits" in contemporary race juris-
prudence. Contemporary race jurisprudence has proven incapable
of addressing aspects of American life that have a remarkably oppres-
160 Id. at 182 tbl.8.
161 Id. at 204 fig.22.
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sive quality: the widespread acceptance of destructive stereotypes;161
the disabling consequences of seemingly innocuous and subtle forms
of racial bias-not full blown racist acts, but acts of racial careless-1653 h
ness; and the unexamined acceptance of so-called societal discrimi-
nation. 1 4 An emphasis on dignity asks what conditions whites must
establish so that they can self-consciously and deliberately seek to
overcome the difficulties of expanding the company of equals to in-
clude members of socially disfavored or oppressed groups. In this
way, a renewed commitment to dignitary concerns of African Ameri-
cans provides us with the means of re-centering our conversation on
matters of substantive racial justice, a way of anchoring race jurispru-
dence.
Focusing on dignitary matters, especially second-order dignity, is
important for another reason. Relational perceptions of dignity in-
form a great deal of our social interactions, including relations that
provide the means for securing and accumulating material stability
and wealth. Thus, we can understand dignity in instrumental terms
as well: as providing a necessary precondition to economic inclusion
162 One particularly pernicious effect of pervasive racial stereotypes is the phenomenon of
.stereotype threat" identified by psychologist Claude Steele. See Claude M. Steele & Joshua
Aronson, Stereotype Threat and the Test Performance of Academically Successful African Americans, in
THE BLACK-WHiTE TEST SCORE GAP 401 (Christopher Jencks & Meredith Phillips eds., 1998).
Steele's research demonstrates that stereotypes can be self-confirming in that groups can deploy
them in social interaction to influence and shape outcomes consistent with the stereotypes.
According to Steele, "stereotype threat" may explain racial disparities in performance on stan-
dardized tests:
African American students know that any faltering could cause them to be seen through
the lens of a negative racial stereotype. Those whose self-regard is predicated on high
achievement-usually the stronger, more confident students--may feel this pressure so
greatly that it disrupts and undermines their test performance.
Id. at 402; see also Claude M. Steele, A Threat in the Air: How Stereotypes Shape Intellectual Identity
and Performance, 52 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 613, 614 (1997) (arguing that stereotype threat, as a situ-
ational threat, can be self-threatening for those who identify with targeted groups); Claude M.
Steele, Thin Ice: Stereotype Threat and Black College Students, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Aug. 1999, at 44
(examining the impact of stereotype threats on the academic performance of black college stu-
dents).
16, See Peggy C. Davis, Law as Microaggression, 98 YALE L.J. 1559, 1565 (1989) (describing mi-
croaggressions as "subtle, stunning, often automatic, and non-verbal exchanges which are 'put
downs' of blacks by offenders," which psychiatrists often view "as 'incessant and cumulative' as-
saults on black self-esteem"); see also ROY L. BROOKS, INTEGRATION OR SEPARATION? A STRATEGY
FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 109 (1996) (describing dignity harms as "macrosystemic" and "ubiqui-
tous and permanent because they result from racialized ways of feeling, thinking, and behaving
toward African Americans (and other minorities) thae emanate from the American culture at
large").
'64 See, e.g., City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 505-06 (1989) (O'Connor, J., plu-
rality opinion) (rejecting "societal discrimination" as ajustification for affirmative action); Wy-
gant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (same); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265, 307-08 (1978) (Powell, J., plurality opinion) (expressing deep skepticism that af-
firmative action may be used to address "societal discrimination").
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and material empowerment. 165 Moreover, to the extent that one's
sense of self-worth is shaped by social and economic status, enhanc-
ing relational perceptions of dignity can have the effect of producing
first-order dignitary benefits as well.
Unfortunately, the story of contemporary race jurisprudence has
been one of preemption of the terms of substantive racial justice, the
evasion of dignitary interests, and the embrace of an antiseptic norm
of colorblindness. But it need not remain this way. The Court's re-
cent decision in Lawrence v. Texas166 suggests that dignity as a concept
has not fully disappeared from the legal landscape, and can be suc-
cessfully deployed to protect the interests not only of those in same-
sex relationships, but also of other oppressed members of society as
well.
III. DIGNITY AND LAWRENCE V. TEXAS
Perhaps the single most dramatic instance in which the current
Supreme Court acknowledged and confirmed the essential dignity of
members of a socially stigmatized and structurally subordinated
group occurred in Lawrence v. Texas.167 John Lawrence and Tyron
Garner 16 were charged and convicted of violating a local ordinance
that outlawed homosexual sodomy. In a landmark ruling, the
Rehnquist Court emphatically declared the statute unconstitutional
on substantive due process grounds.
165 For a discussion of the vital role of social networks in capital formation and wealth crea-
tion, see Glenn C. Loury, A Dynamic Theory of Racial Income Differences, in WOMEN, MINORITIES,
AND EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 153 (Phyllis A. Wallace & Annette LaMond eds., 1977); see
also JAMES S. COLEMAN, FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL THEORY (1990) (examining various kinds of
social capital and the ways in which it is generated in order to create social relationships);
ROBERT PUTNAM, MAKING DEMOCRACYWORK (1993) (describing the great benefits of social net-
works and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them); Kenneth Arrow,
What Has Economics to Say About Racial Discrimination ?, 12J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 1998, at 91, 98
(concluding that the network model, in which personal interactions develop from transactional
relations, is most appropriate in studying the labor market); George J. Bojas, Ethnic Capital and
Intergenerational Income Mobility, 107 Q.J. ECON. 123 (1992) (arguing that skills of the ethnic con-
temporaries of parents are as important an input to human capital accumulation as the skills of
parents).
166 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
167 Id.
1 Interestingly, some commentators have suggested that Lawrence and Garner were not in a
longstanding relationship. See, e.g., Nan D. Hunter, Living With Lawrence, 88 MINN. L. REV.
1103, 1138 (2004) (remarking that "neither the record nor their attorneys suggested thatJohn
Lawrence and Tyron Garner had anything other than a mutually desired fleeting encounter"
and theorizing that the Court's attempt to present them as a couple is indicative of society's
heteronormative impulse).
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• - 169Although the ruling itself was hailed as a victory for gay rights,
perhaps most surprising was the candor and solicitude expressed in
Justice Kennedy's majority opinion when addressing matters of dig-
nity. Lawrence acknowledges and powerfully affirms the dignity of
homosexuals, and does so in a deeply respectful and non-patronizing
manner. It acknowledges dignity in universal and undifferentiated
terms. In doing so, the Court deemed the lives of homosexuals wor-
thy of genuine, categorical respect equivalent to that afforded to
those of heterosexuals. It is a moving opinion precisely because it
comprehends gays as worthy of the presumption of humanity and in-
clusion in greater society. In this light, Lawrence exemplifies how dig-
nity can best be meaningfully incorporated into equality jurispru-
dence to promote substantive justice for members of oppressed
groups in American society.
At the heart of Lawrence's dignitary enterprise is a series of ac-
knowledgments. In Bowers v. Hardwick, 17 decided almost twenty years
before Lawrence, the Court had addressed the issue of sodomy in the
narrowest of terms, failing to comprehend gay sex as intrinsic to a life
worthy of dignity and respect. 171 In Lawrence, Justice Kennedy publicly
acknowledges the error in framing the issue of sodomy divorced from
its human context. Framing the issue so narrowly, according to Jus-
tice Kennedy, "discloses the Court's own failure to appreciate the ex-
tent of the liberty at stake.' 72 Justice Kennedy fully understood that
consideration of the dignitary interests of gays marked a substantial
departure from Bowers-. "The doctrine of stare decisis is essential to the
respect accorded to the judgments of the Court and to the stability of
the law. It is not, however, an inexorable command.",
73
169 See, e.g., Nancy Gibbs, A Yea for Gays: The Supreme Court Scraps Sodomy Laws, Setting off a Hot
Debate, TIME,July 7, 2003, at 38 (noting that "[g]ay-rights activists declared Lawrence a victory on
the scale of the Brown v. Board of Education decision, which desegregated schools in 1954"); Ka-
mau High, Texas Sodomy Laws Overturned by US Top Court, FIN. TIMES (FT.COM), Jun. 26, 2003
(describing the Lawrence decision as "a major victory for gay rights activists"). But see Gary D.
Allison, Sanctioning Sodomy: The Supreme Court Liberates Gay Sex and Limits State Power to Vindicate
the Moral Sentiments of the People, 39 TULSA L. REv. 95, 101 (2004) (describing the Lawrence deci-
sion as a "remarkably tepid gay rights victory"); Sandi Farrell, Reconsidering the Gender-Equality
Perspective for Understanding LGBT Rights, 13 LAW & SEXUALITY 605, 689 (2004) ("Romer and Law-
rence are too unsturdy pegs on which for gay rights advocates to hang our hats.").
170 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
1 Interestingly, the Court's failure to address this issue more broadly might have been at-
tributable to the style of briefing in the case. As William Eskridge explains, Professor Laurence
Tribe knew that "there was no Court majority for a 'gay rights' argument, and so his brief for
the challenger pushed homosexuality into a legal closet and emphasized the abuse of state
power represented by the gendarmerie's charge into Michael Hardwick's bedroom." William
N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on Constitutional Law in the Twentieth
Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062, 2181 (2000).
172 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567.
173 Id. at 577.
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Lawrence also contains an explicit acknowledgment of the equal
humanity of gays. The Bowers Court, in disturbingly antiseptic terms,
upheld the criminalization of gay sex and sent the unmistakable sig-
nal that gay sex was somehow undignified and homosexuals were un-
worthy of mutual respect. In contrast, Justice Kennedy's opinion in
Lawrence affirms the essential humanity of gays. Bowds criminaliza-
tion of homosexual intercourse, according to Justice Kennedy, is
problematic because "[i]ts continuance as precedent demeans the
lives of homosexual persons. ,11 4 Justice Kennedy emphasizes this ac-
knowledgment of the humanity of gays by forthrightly distinguishing
homosexual intercourse from the litany of proscribed socially deviant
practices routinely invoked in connection with sodomy by opponents
of the gay rights movement.'75
The Lawrence opinion also contains a surprising acknowledgment
of the strategic use of historical narrative in the subordination of
gays. According to Justice Kennedy, "the historical grounds relied
upon in Bowers are more complex than the majority opinion and the
concurring opinion by Chief Justice Burger indicate."76 Moreover,
Justice Kennedy made clear that the justifications for criminalizing
sodomy need not be privileged simply because the Court had articu-
lated them in the past. "To the extent Bowers relied on values we
share with a wider civilization," observes Justice Kennedy, "it should
be noted that [those purported values] have been rejected else-
where.' 77 More importantly, according to Justice Kennedy, "[t]here
has been no showing that in this country the governmental interest in
circumscribing personal choice is somehow more legitimate or ur-
gent.'' 7 8 In this way, Justice Kennedy appears to suggest that the pre-
vailing view that subordinates homosexuals who practice gay sex may
be illegitimate.
Justice Kennedy's acknowledgment of the oppressive nature and
stigmatizing effect of these laws deepens the suggestion that the pre-
vailing view on criminalization of gay sex is illegitimate. The concept
of liberty is organic, according to Justice Kennedy, and the Framers
"knew times can bind us to certain truths and later generations can
174 Id. at 575.
175 See id. at 569, 578 (observing that laws prohibiting sodomy were directed at "predatory acts
of an adult man against a minor girl or minor boy" and that "[t]he present case does not in-
volve minors," "does not involve persons who might be injured or coerced or who are situated
in relationships where consent might not easily be refused," and "does not involve public con-
duct or prostitution").
176 Id. at 571.
177 Id. at 576. Justice Kennedy points to both policies of foreign nations and legal scholarship
to "cast[] some doubt on the sweeping nature of the statement[s] [made in Bowers pertaining]
to private homosexual conduct between consenting adults." Id. at 571.
178 Id. at 577.
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see that laws once thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to
oppress." 79 Not only does enforcement of such laws serve to oppress,
but their mere presence may have stigmatizing effects. According to
Justice Kennedy, "[i]f protected conduct is made criminal and the
law which does so remains unexamined for its substantive validity, its
stigma might remain even if it were not enforceable as drawn for
equal protection reasons."'180 Justice Kennedy went on to note:
"When homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law of the State,
that declaration in and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual
persons to discrimination both in the public and in the private
spheres." 0
1
Justice Kennedy's embrace of a liberty and dignitary aesthetic en-
ables him to advance the proposition that each of us should be con-
cerned about the Texas statute because it "ha[s] more far-reaching
consequences, touching upon the most private human conduct, sex-
ual behavior, and in the most private of places, the home. The stat-
utes do seek to control a personal relationship that.. . is within the
liberty of persons to choose without being punished as criminals."
18 2
This acknowledgment of a universal and unfettered dignity sends a
powerful message to all Americans that gays are entitled to respect
and inclusion because such persons are members of the extended
American family. Because "[t]he petitioners are entitled to respect
for their private lives," declares Justice Kennedy, the state must be
precluded from "demean[ing] their existence or control[ling] their
,,183destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime.
IV. TAKING DIGNITY SERIOUSLY: LESSONS FROM LAWRENCE
Justice Kennedy's opinion in Lawrence suggests that the Court can
take dignity seriously in the pursuit of protection and validation of
the status of members of subordinated groups. In addition, Lawrence
provides some discursive insight into how this enterprise might be
undertaken in the equally contentious field of American race rela-
tions.
Respect for the first-order dignity of members of socially disfa-
vored minority groups entails some acknowledgment of the equal
humanity of those individuals. The Lawrence Court undertook the
task of distinguishing gay sex from prohibitions against bestiality to
cleanse gays of stigma-by-association. In this way, the Court sought to
179 Id. at 579 (emphasis added).
ISO Id. at 575 (explaining why overturning the ordinance on equal protection grounds, as en-
dorsed by O'Connor, was not satisfactory).
181 Id.
182 Id. at 567.
183 Id. at 578.
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demonstrate that the practice of gay sex in no way denigrates the es-
sential humanity of gays. By revealing the spuriousness of arguments
to support criminalizing the so-called gay lifestyle, the Court affirms
the inherent worth of gays as human beings.
Respect for first-order dignity in the race context entails a simi-
larly explicit acknowledgment and affirmation of the equal humanity
of members of racially oppressed groups. As discussed above, the
failure to extend that presumption to minorities, especially blacks,
has deep historical roots. As Glenn Loury has acknowledged:
"[P]eople do not freely give the presumption of equal humanity.
Only philosophers do that .... [T]he rest of us tend to ration the ex-
tent to which we will presume an equal humanity of our fellows.
14
First-order dignity, then, represents the first step along the path of
this dignitary enterprise in race jurisprudence.
Attention to second-order dignitary concerns is reflected in two
separate acknowledgments by the Lawrence Court. The first is the
Court's acknowledgment of the role of historical narrative in shaping
legal outcomes. Justice Kennedy's revelation in Lawrence that selec-
tive historical narrative is often used as a means to subordinate sug-
gests that the acknowledgment and affirmance of dignity of racial
minorities may involve a similar admission to the extent that the
Court's prior decisions were based upon contested historical or con-
ceptual grounds. Dignitary concerns may demand that the Court not
only reconsider its preferred reading of the purpose of the Recon-
struction Amendments, but also the centrality of colorblindness in
the Court's equality jurisprudence and the Court's historic inability
to distinguish between benign and burdensome race distinctions
when it attempts to do so in a contextless environment.
Second, and relatedly, the Lawrence Court acknowledged the nar-
row and provincial understanding it held regarding gay sex in par-
ticular and gay relationships more generally. Specifically, the Court
acknowledged that its understanding of the concept of liberty as it re-
lates to gays was equally emaciated.' In short, the Court admits that
the Bowers Court got it wrong both contextually and jurisprudentially.
In the race relations context, it is imperative that proponents of
racial justice continue to advance the notion that the promise of the
Reconstruction Amendments entails far more than procedural equal-
ity. To the extent that the Court believes that procedural equality
and fidelity to the norm of colorblindness is tantamount to racial jus-
tice, it continues to get it wrong and getting it wrong demeans the
lives of those who have suffered historic and contemporary injustices
on account of race.
184 LOURY, supra note 14, at 87.
185 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574-75.
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Although Lawrence provides insight into how to seek dignity in
race jurisprudence, one should be mindful of a number of key fea-
tures of the Lawrence decision that impede the ability to capitalize on
its approach to dignitary concerns in the race context.
A. Race, Sexuality, and Doctrinal Convergence
Gay and lesbian identities plainly differ conceptually from racial
identities. For instance, race is an immutable characteristic, whereas
homosexuality is commonly understood to be mutable. 186 To be sure,
blacks may adopt strategies of racial performance that deflect atten-
tion away from their racial make-up. Adaptive behaviors may range
from simply adopting stereotypically white American language, ges-
tures, and dress to full-fledged replication of both the physical and
cultural identity, a practice commonly referred to as "passing."'87 But
the mutability of the gay identity allows gays to shield their identity
from public view not only with greater ease, but also with remarkable
thoroughness. 8 In this sense, the gay and lesbian identities are con-
ceptually far more performative than racial identities.
8 9
The largely performative core of gay and lesbian identities sug-
gests, at first blush, that a mode of empowerment centered on dignity
would have greater impact. If homosexuality is a mutable characteris-
tic, the decision to participate in openly gay relationships is an exer-
cise in autonomy. Dignity is fundamentally about acknowledging in-
herent worth and equal humanity, and to treat another with dignity
means that one must respect human agency. In this way, a focus on
dignity is empowering insofar as it demands respect for autonomy
and individual choice.
8 See Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769, 796 (2002) (tracing the scientific debate of
Freud's time regarding the correct designation of homosexuality-as biological or cultural, for
example-as informing the mutability of homosexuality).
187 See RANDALL KENNEDY, INTERRACIAL INTIMACIES 281-338 (2003) (describing the practice
of blacks visually and "aurally" passing as white); Yoshino, supra note 186, at 926 (describing the
practice of "covering" by gays and blacks who seek to assimilate by downplaying or otherwise
making it difficult for persons to discern one's sexual orientation or race).
1 See Yoshino, supra note 186, at 814-27 (discussing the historic norm of "passing" within
the gay community, and its contestation and eventual dislocation in the 1970s). This is not to
suggest that racial minorities do not engage in "covering" type behaviors to draw attention away
from one's racial identity. See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85
CORNELL L. REv. 1259, 1265 (2000) (arguing that minorities often emphasize their identity as
workers in part to contradict work-related stereotypes associated with their racial identity). My
point is simply that the technique of identity masking can be more powerfully deployed by gays
than racial minorities.
189 Exactly how much of gay identity is performative remains the subject of lively debate. See
Yoshino, supra note 186, at 865-68 (discussing "strong performative," "weak performative," and
"classical" models of gay identity advanced by Judith Butler).
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The consequences of dignity in the realm of sexuality are far more
circumscribed than in the racial context. To the extent that dignity is
concerned about equal humanity and worthiness of inclusion, it is
worth noting that gays were always understood, on some level, as pre-
sumptively worthy of inclusion. Gays have always been understood as
residents of the human family. Indeed, the history of oppression of
gays is one characterized by assumptions of deviant humanity, not an
essential lack of it. Homosexuality, until fairly recently, was com-
monly understood as a medically or psychologically treatable condi-
tion.' g° Treatments traditionally ranged from surgically invasive tech-
niques, such as clitoridectomy and castration, 9' to aversion therapy
and psychoanalysis.'92 The prevailing understanding of homosexual-
ity as a pscyhopathology led to its inclusion in the Diagnostic and Sta-
tistical Manual of Mental Disorders9 3 and fueled the expansion of
conversion therapy.
9 4
By contrast, the history of oppression of blacks is one character-
ized by the denial of humanity. While the heterosexual majority has
provided for the inclusion of gays, whites have held deep suspicions
as to the worthiness of including blacks within the American political
family. Moreover, suspicion of equal worth is not an artifact of years
past-conservative racial theorists continue to question openly the
equal humanity of blacks.1
9 5
190 SeeJONATHAN KATZ, GAY AMERICAN HISTORY: LESBIANS AND GAY MEN IN THE U.S.A. 129-
207 (1976) (describing various "treatments" to remedy homosexuality).
191 See id. at 129 (identifying these as part of the repertoire of then-available treatments).
Katz also notes the existence of other physically invasive practices, including neurosurgery,
shock treatment, and the use of psychotropic drugs. Id. at 129-207.
192 See id. at 148-50, 198-99 (identifying psychoanalysis and aversion therapy as among the
less invasive techniques).
193 See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS
39 (1st ed. 1952) (identifying "homosexuality" as "pathological behavior"). Although homo-
sexuality was formally deleted from the second edition by a 1973 vote of the American Psychiat-
ric Society, see AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS vi (2d ed. 1968 & 8th prtg. 1975), it was replaced with the category "Sexual Orienta-
tion Disturbance," which purported to describe individuals "who are disturbed by, in conflict
with, or wish to change their sexual orientation." Id. The current category, "Gender Identity
Disorder," see AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS 533-38 (4th ed. 1994), retains this understanding of homosexuality as pathology.
See 1 LAWRENCE D. MASS, HOMOSEXUALITY AND SEXUALITY, DIALOGUES OF THE SEXUAL
REVOLUTION 219 (1990).
194 See Jack Drescher, I'm Your Handyman: A History of Reparative Therapies, 36 J.
HOMOSEXUALITY 19, 25-26 (1998) (discussing, with Dr. Richard Green, the declassification of
homosexuality as a mental disorder and Green's contribution to the recognition of gender-
identity disorder as a psycho-sexual disorder). For an autobiographical account of the experi-
ence of conversion therapy, see MARTIN DUBERMAN, CURES: A GAY MAN'S ODYSSEY (1991). For
a brief history of the rise of conversion therapy, see Yoshino, supra note 186, at 784-803.
195 The historic questioning of black humanity now takes the form of a deep skepticism re-
garding the capacity of blacks to function on par with whites in civil society. Dinesh D'Souza's
End of Racism: Principles for Multiracial Society is one particularly corrosive example of this. Ac-
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Not surprisingly, in the racial context, an assumption of equal
humanity and worthiness of inclusion would appear to have far
greater consequences. Whereas treating gays with dignity means lift-
ing the stigma imposed on persons involved in gay sexual relation-
ships, treating blacks with dignity presumably would entail lifting
stigma that, when operationalized, has relegated blacks to social, po-
litical, and economic margins of society. For this reason, one might
be inclined to think that a dignity focus makes more sense in the
realm of sexuality and may be of limited utility in the racial context.
An additional layer of complexity arises from the fact that race
and sexuality are traditionally analyzed under different doctrinal
frameworks-equal protection for race, and substantive due process
for sexuality. The analytic distinction between these two doctrinal
fields impacts the kinds of arguments that resonate with the Court.
In the realm of modem substantive due process, the inquiry is typi-
cally phrased in terms of whether a fundamental personal right has
been impaired. This is usually done without reference to the distinct-
iveness of the aggrieved claimant. The focus remains on the right
that has allegedly been infringed, and whether the state's infringe-
cording to D'Souza, African Americans "continue to show conspicuous evidence of failure" in
nearly every facet of life, including "failure in the workplace, failure in schools and colleges, and
failure to maintain intact families and secure communities." See DINESH D'SOuzA, END OF
RACISM: PRINCIPLES FOR MULTIRACIAL SOCIETY 6 (1995). Importantly, these failures, along with
the poverty and isolation experienced by blacks, are "not the cause, but the result, of low intel-
ligence." Id. at 445. Thus, D'Souza concludes that racial hostility that reinforces the subordi-
nated status of blacks will likely persist until "blacks can close the civilization gap." Id. at 527.
Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray famously argued that the social ills of welfare, poverty,
and underclass were a function of biologically determined intelligence, thereby implying that
minorities, who are disproportionately represented in the lower-echelons of society, were ge-
netically inferior to whites. See generally RIcHARDJ. HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL
CURVE (1994). But see THE BELL CURVE WARS (Steven Fraser ed., 1995) (offering an expansive
refutation of the claims advanced by Herrnstein and Murray). Stephan and Abigail Thernstrom
have achieved notoriety advancing similar claims about the cognitive inferiority of minorities.
See Abigail Thernstrom & Stephen Thernstrom, The Real Story of Black Progress, WALL ST.J., Sept.
3, 1997, at A20 ("Those tests show that African-American students, on average, are alarmingly
far behind whites in math, science, reading and writing. As a consequence, what may look like
persistent employment discrimination is better described as employers rewarding workers [who
have] relatively strong cognitive skills."). See generally THERNSTROM & THERNSTROM, supra note
150 (recognizing that the civil rights movement has improved the status of blacks in America,
but investigating and questioning the lack of progress in many areas). Claims of inferior bio-
logical endowments of intelligence and capacity for civilization recall arguments advanced by
Eugenicists of the early twentieth century. See, e.g., Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (up-
holding a Virginia statute allowing for involuntary sterilization of "mental defectives" because
"[t]hree generations of imbeciles are enough"); CHARLES CARROLL, THE NEGRO A BEAST (1900)
(arguing that Negroes were not only inherently inferior, but lacked a soul or kinship with God
and thus were not even fully human); MADISON GRANT, THE PASSING OF THE GREAT RACE xxvii
(1916) (arguing that blacks had proven themselves incapable of civilization and that intellectu-
als should dedicate themselves to "rousing fellow Americans to the overwhelming importance of
race and to the folly of the Melting Pot").
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ment is justified. In contrast, traditional equality jurisprudence has
enabled courts to interrogate the distinctiveness of the aggrieved
claimant and the right that has allegedly been infringed. This sort of
interrogation provides courts with an opportunity to engage in a
meaningful discussion of, and ultimately incorporate, dignitary con-
cerns into the analytical framework.
Contemporary equality jurisprudence, however, eschews this sort
of deep thinking about the distinctiveness of the aggrieved complain-
ant. Indeed, the Court's steadfast reliance upon the norm of color-
blindness prevents it from pursuing this line of analysis and makes it
correspondingly difficult to address dignitary concerns with reference
to history and context. This conundrum, of course, is a function of
the doctrinal framework developed by the Court (and, in theory,
could be set aside), but nevertheless would appear to present a for-
midable obstacle.
Despite these core differences, however, the approach in Lawrence
is promising in the racial context precisely because it links the ideas
of liberty and autonomy with traditional core values of equal treat-
ment and protection. As Justice Kennedy explained, " [e] quality of
treatment and the due process right to demand respect for conduct
protected by the substantive guarantee of liberty are linked in impor-
tant respects, and a decision on the latter point advances both inter-
ests.' 96 In this way, the Court makes clear that it is less concerned
about dignifying the act of sodomy, and more focused on treating
persons involved in gay relationships with equal humanity. Justice
Kennedy's position is remarkably similar to Chief Justice Warren's
approach in Loving v. Virginia.'9 While it is true that the Warren
Court viewed marriage, in some sense, as a fundamental right, the
Court was most concerned about treating those who choose to marry
across the colorline with equal respect. Indeed, Loving represents a
most powerful manifesto against white supremacy precisely because it
affirms the equal humanity of blacks and their worthiness of inclu-
sion in the human family.' 9
196 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003).
197 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that Virginia's prohibition of interracial marriages was uncon-
stitutional).
198 As ChiefJustice Warren explained:
The fact that Virginia prohibits only interracial marriages involving white persons dem-
onstrates that the racial classifications must stand on their own justification, as measures
designed to maintain White Supremacy.
... Under our Constitution, the freedom to marry or not marry, a person of an-
other race resides with the individual and cannot be infringed by the State.
Id. at 11-12.
199 Id. at 12 (observing that "[tihe freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the
vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men").
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The blending of equal protection and substantive due process in
Lawrence, with its antisubordinationist echoes of Loving, underscores
the importance of dignitary concerns within the realms of race and
sexuality. Moreover, Lawrence's rejection of a purely equal protection
approach has strong implications in the racial context. Justice
O'Connor argued in her concurrence that the Texas sodomy statute
was problematic mainly because it singled out homosexual sodomy
for criminalization. In her view, a "neutral" ban on all sodomy,
whether practiced by homosexuals or heterosexuals, would satisfy the
safeguards of the Equal Protection Clause. 200  The majority of the
Court rejected this approach precisely because it did nothing to af-
firm the equal worth of gay couples and all but ensured that a vital
component of any meaningful same-sex relationship-a component
that homosexuals are distinctly drawn to-would continue to serve as
the basis for stigma.20 ' As Professor Laurence Tribe explains, "The
net effect [of a complete ban on sodomy] would be to establish the
legitimacy-and certainly the rationality, at a minimum-of what Jus-
tice O'Connor labeled 'discrimination' against those whose sexual
desires pull them toward erotic fulfillment exclusively with lovers of
their own sex."
20 2
Treating gays with equal dignity and respect necessarily goes be-
yond both "fundamental rights" and equal protection analysis. This
move beyond traditional doctrinal forms is not unlike what propo-
nents of an antisubordinationist reading of the Reconstruction
Amendments have advanced over the past two decades, albeit within
the confines of equality jurisprudence. As Professor Charles Law-
rence explained:
[T]here is another way to think about the problem of race and racism
and the project of racism's eradication. This is to think of racial equality
as a substantive societal condition rather than as an individual right. The
substantive approach sees the disestablishment of ideologies and systems
of racial subordination as indispensable and prerequisite to individual
human dignity and equality."
Thus, the Court's treatment of matters of sexuality in Lawrence is well-
suited to the task of empowering African Americans.
20 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 584-85 ("I am confident, however, that so long as the Equal Protec-
tion Clause requires a sodomy law to apply equally to the private consensual conduct of homo-
sexuals and heterosexuals alike, such a law would not long stand in our democratic society.").
2I0 Id. at 575 ("When homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law of the State, that dec-
laration in and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual persons to discrimination both in
the public and in the private spheres.").
M Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The "Fundamental Right" That Dare Not Speak Its
Name, 117 HARv. L. REV. 1893, 1911 (2004).
203 Charles R. Lawrence, III, Foreword: Race, Multiculturalism, and the Jurisprudence of Transfor-
mation, 47 STAN. L. REV. 819, 824-25 (1995). Others have advanced similar readings of the Re-
construction Amendments. See supra note 98.
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B. Dignity and Remedy
In Lawrence, the remedy that went along with the acknowledgment
and affirmance of the essential humanity and social value of gays was
simply to strike down the Texas statute criminalizing sodomy. In the
race context, the remedy may be far less circumscribed. Taking dig-
nity seriously presumably would entail a remedial progression. In
addition to the discursive acknowledgment of first- and second-order
dignity, the remedy likely would entail a critical re-examination of the
prevailing approach to equality jurisprudence. This, in turn, could
have tremendous substantive and material consequences with respect
to minority set-aside contracts, affirmative action, and funding for
public schools, for example. In addition, other policies and practices
that arguably produce stigmatizing or dignitary harm, such as racial
profiling and racial disparities in incarceration rates, may be reviewed
as part of a renewed emphasis on dignity.
One plausible objection is simply one of feasibility-that the
Court, as currently constituted, would never undertake' this project.
Indeed, when faced with a similar issue in Washington v. Davis -
whether a litigant could use disparate impact theory to advance an
equal protection challenge-the Court flatly refused to expand the
opportunities for a more thorough, racial-remedial scheme. As the
Court explained:
A rule that a statute designed to serve neutral ends is nevertheless invalid,
absent compelling justification, if in practice it benefits or burdens one
race more than another would be far-reaching and would raise serious
questions about, and perhaps invalidate, a whole range of tax, welfare,
public service, regulatory, and licensing statutes that may be more bur-
densome to the poor and to the average black than to the more affluent
white.205
This is consistent with the "interest-convergence theory" offered by
Professor Derrick Bell to explain why advances in civil rights appear
only when whites can be convinced that they stand to benefit as
well. 06 Indeed, the Court's hesitancy in Davis and its current disposi-
tion offer a poignant glimpse at how modest our approach to racial
justice truly is. Nevertheless, there is value in simply pointing out that
the current Supreme Court's jurisprudence indulges in delusional
and counterfeit thinking when it chooses to evade core dignitary
concerns in the context of racial disputes. Lawrence not only reminds
us that such dignitary concerns are not "off limits," but also provides
426 U.S. 229 (1976).
205 Id. at 248.
206 Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Comment, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Di-
lemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523 (1980) (arguing that blacks' interest in racial equality will only
be accommodated when it converges with whites' interests).
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insight into a world in which members of socially disfavored groups
can obtain judicial acknowledgment and affirmance of dignity. The
challenge for proponents of racial justice is to replicate this success.
In addition to the feasibility objection, a practical problem pre-
sented by the renewed emphasis on dignitary concerns involves the
standard that courts should use to scrutinize potentially offending
laws or policies. In Lawrence, the Court invokes the language of "fun-
damental rights" analysis, observing that the ability to engage in a
meaningful gay relationship involves a "protection of liberty under
the Due Process Clause [that] has a substantive dimension of funda-
mental significance in defining the rights of the person." °7 This con-
clusory formulation reveals a great deal of flexibility, which some will
undoubtedly find undesirable in the racial context. Proponents of
racial justice will likely argue that such a standard, in the hands ofju-
dicial conservatives, will neutralize any positive effects because it may
accommodate high levels of judicial deference to oppressive legisla-
tive policy. Conservatives will argue that such a flexible standard will
only serve to encourage judicial activism on the racial front. The
struggle over appropriate levels of scrutiny, however, is nothing new
in equality jurisprudence.2 8 Invariably, the Court will strive to strike
the appropriate balance, for as Justice Thurgood Marshall once ex-
plained, "[slo long as the basis of the discrimination is clearly identi-
fied, it is possible to test it against the State's purpose for such dis-
crimination-whatever the standard of equal protection analysis
employed.29
Finally, there remains the problem of determining what respect
for dignity demands in a given context. For instance, how would a
renewed emphasis on dignity play out in law enforcement policy in a
working class minority community in which both the victims and per-
petrators of crime are predominately African American? Would ele-
vated concerns about the dignity of law-abiding residents warrant
greater scrutiny of suspicious individuals to promote greater security?
207 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 566 (2003).
208 Compare Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 227-37 (1995) (holding that
strict scrutiny applies to all racial classifications), and City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488
U.S. 469, 494 (1989) (noting that "the standard of review under the Equal Protection Clause is
not dependent on the race of those burdened or benefited by a particular classification"), with
Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 563-600 (1990) (applying intermediate scrutiny
to benign racial classifications), and Regents of the Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 359
(1978) (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (noting that "a number of consid-
erations-developed in gender discrimination cases but which carry even more force when ap-
plied to racial classifications-lead us to conclude that racial classifications designed to further
remedial purposes 'must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially
related to achievement of those objectives").
209 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 93 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing); see also Tribe, supra note 202, at 1916 (discussing standards of review).
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Or would respect for dignity entail fewer stops, less intrusive policing,
and an overall diminished police presence? One response is that
dignity demands that law enforcement police the hypothetical minor-
ity community in the same manner as it would police any other
community. But not every community experiences law enforcement
presence in the same manner. Dignity, at a minimum, would de-
mand respect for differing community norms. But notice that we are
still left with the task of determining what precisely dignity demands
in a given context and operationalizing dignity in a way that does not
run afoul of community norms.
C. Lawrence As the "Gay Rights" Brown Decision
Lawrence can be read as the Brown decision for gay rights: it repre-
sents an attempt by the Court to enshrine the rights of gays in the
name of a collective sense of justice and dignity. Yet one of the most
powerful criticisms of Brown has been that addressing dignity and
stigma concerns, without more, does little to alleviate material condi-
tions of oppression.2'0 As Professor Derrick Bell argued: "Black peo-
ple will never gain full equality in this country. Even those herculean
efforts we hail as successful will produce no more than temporary
'peaks of progress,' short-lived victories that slide into irrelevance as
racial patterns adapt in ways that maintain white dominance."... Or
as Kimberl6 Crenshaw states, "[w]hite race consciousness, in a new
[post-Brown] form but still virulent plays an important, perhaps cru-
cial, role in the new regime that has legitimated the deteriorating
day-to-day material conditions of the majority of Blacks."212  Recent
books to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the Brown decision
210 See, e.g., GARY ORFIELD & SUSAN E. EATON, DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION: THE QUIET
REVERSAL OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 37-38, 84-87 (1996) (discussing educational pro-
gress by African Americans since Brown); GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE 105
(1991) ("It is equally clear that the Constrained Court view captures the key reasons why, de-
spite Supreme Court action, nothing changed in the first decade after Brown."); RAYMOND
WOLTERS, THE BURDEN OF BROWN: THIRTY YEARS OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 282-89 (1984)
(noting the continued disparity in educational achievement since Brown); Derrick A. Bell, Jr.,
Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE
L.J. 470 (1976) (concluding that the promise of Brown failed urban black students who remain
in unequal, all-black schools); see also Kevin Brown, Revisiting the Supreme Court's Opinion in
Brown v. Board of Education from a Multiculturalist Perspective, in BROWN v. BOARD OF
EDUCATION: THE CHALLENGE FOR TODAY'S SCHOOLS 44 (Ellen Condliffe Lagemann & LaMar P.
Miller eds., 1996) (noting that while Brown "provided significant positive changes in American
society," nevertheless "[r ] acial and ethnic segregation in public schools is likely to increase").
211 Derrick Bell, Racial Realism, 24 CONN. L. REV. 363, 373 (1992).
212 Crenshaw, supra note 6, at 1378-79.
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have expressed similar reservations regarding the case's transforma-" " " " 213
tive possibilities.
The thrust of this criticism applies not only to Lawrence, but also to
any attempt to seek substantive racial justice through exclusively dig-
nitary means. If it is arguable that the promise of Brown has been
largely eviscerated over the years, one might be rightly skeptical of
the good that can come from this renewed interest in dignity.
Despite the mixed legacy of Brown, I nevertheless subscribe to the
view that acknowledging and affirming the equal humanity of people
of color is a good thing, in and of itself. Nothing has proven more
disabling of African American advancement than the corrosive denial
of equal humanity. Enslavement of blacks was rooted in the prevail-
ing view that blacks were, in some way, less human than whites. 4 In
the modem era, claims of inferior intelligence and work ethic fueled
opposition to full citizenship, participation injury service, voting and
other mundane aspects of public life, as well as employment and
educational advancement. Presumptions of cultural inferiority justi-
fied segregation, and are reflected in today's social networks, housing
patterns, and racially disparate law enforcement policies. In many
ways, the acknowledgment of equal humanity is both the first and fi-
nal frontier of American race relations.
Judicial acknowledgment of second-order communal dignity not
only expands our understanding of what racial justice entails, but
makes relevant a host of considerations routinely thought to be "off
limits" in contemporary race jurisprudence: the widespread accep-
tance of destructive stereotypes, the disabling consequences of seem-
ingly innocuous, subtle forms of racial bias, and the unexamined ac-
ceptance of so-called societal discrimination, among others. Focusing
on dignity, then, provides us with an opportunity to move the race
dialogue forward by re-centering our conversation on matters of sub-
stantive racial justice. This is a welcome reprieve from the incessant
wrangling over the scope and contours of procedural equality that
213 See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE
UNFULFILLED HOPES FOR RACIAL REFORM (2004) (arguing that Brown stirred confusion and con-
flict, and positing that the question for racial justice requires the eradication of silent covenants
that serve to maintain the status quo); CHARLES J. OGLETREE, JR., ALL DELIBERATE SPEED:
REFLECTIONS ON THE FIRST HALF CENTURY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION (2004) (arguing
that the Brown decision was flawed from its inception because it is deeply susceptible to defiance
and circumvention).
214 See CARROLL, supra note 195, at 125-36 (offering natural history and biblical evidence that
African Americans were not human, but a soulless species of Ape); THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES
ON VIRGINIA (1787), reprinted in 2 THE WRITINGS OF THOMASJEFFERSON 1, 201 (Thomas Jeffer-
son Memorial Ass'n 1903) (concluding that "blacks, whether originally a distinct race, or made
distinct by time and circumstances, are inferior to whites in the endowments of both body and
mind"); see also Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857) (arguing that blacks were
justifiably reduced to slavery for their own benefit).
[Vol. 7:3
DIGNITY IN RACEJURISPRUDENCE
has come to dominate contemporary race jurisprudence. It is critical
that we identify and resurrect these easily overlooked dignity con-
cerns, lest they be forgotten entirely, and re-deploy them to rescue an
increasingly unanchored jurisprudence.
CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have argued for a renewed commitment to seek
dignity in contemporary race jurisprudence. Sincere attention to
dignitary concerns provides an important mechanism for expanding
the possibilities of substantive racial justice. Focusing on dignitary
concerns demands that we historicize, contextualize, and deepen our
discussion when it comes to matters of race, and this is precisely the
kind of analysis that contemporary courts have chosen to evade.
To be clear, I view the Court's ritualistic transformation and eva-
sion of dignity in the racial context as a crisis in need of immediate
attention. Yet I realize that this is a crisis centuries in the making. In
1852, Frederick Douglass addressed the indignity of slavery and the
issue of equal humanity before an anti-slavery group on the heels of a
Fourth of July celebration:
You are all on fire at the mention of liberty for France or for Ireland; but
are as cold as an iceberg at the thought of liberty for the enslaved of
America .... You profess to believe "that, of one blood, God made all na-
tions of men to dwell on the face of all the earth," and hath commanded
all men, everywhere to love one another; yet you notoriously hate, (and
glory in your hatred), all men whose skins are not colored like your own.
You declare, before the world, and are understood by the world to de-
clare, that you "hold these truths to be self evident, that all men are cre-
ated equal; and are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable
rights; and that, among these are, life, liberty, and the pursuit of happi-
ness;" and yet, you hold securely, in a bondage which, according to your
own Thomas Jefferson, "is worse than ages of that which your fathers rose
in rebellion to oppose," a seventh part of the inhabitants of your coun-
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try.
Over a century later, Martin Luther King, Jr., spoke directly to the
dignitary harm occasioned by racial segregation:
I guess it is easy for those who have never felt the stinging darts of segre-
gation to say "wait." But when you have seen vicious mobs lynch your
mothers and fathers at will and drown your sisters and brothers at whim;
when you have seen hate-filled policemen curse, kick, brutalize and even
kill... ; when you have seen the vast majority [of blacks] smothering in
an air-tight cage of poverty in the midst of an affluent society... ; when
215 FREDERICK DOUGLASS, What to the Slave is the Fourth ofJuly?: An Address Delivered in Rochester,
New York on 5July 1852, in 2 THE FREDERICK DOUGLASS PAPERS 359, 383 (John Blassingame ed.,
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you have to concoct an answer for a five-year old son asking in agonizing
pathos: "Daddy, why do white people treat colored people so mean?";
... when your first name becomes "nigger" and your middle name be-
comes "boy"... and when your wife and mother are never given the re-
spected title "Mrs."... ; then you will understand why we find it difficult
to wait.
2 16
In the post-Civil Rights era, African Americans fear neither enslave-
ment nor the brutal reality of vulgar dejure segregation. Yet we con-
tinue to struggle for the acknowledgment of equal humanity and in-
clusion in the American political family.
The task of acknowledging and affirming the self-worth and social
value of socially disfavored groups is not easy. It entails, among other
things, deep questioning of our shared intuitions and healthy inter-
rogation of the legitimacy of prior institutional decision making. It
requires a Court willing to brush law and legal institutions against the
grain. To be sure, there are real differences between the struggle for
equality in the gay rights and race relations contexts, some of which
may affect the viability of a dignity-centered approach to empower-
ment. Yet Lawrence provides a glimpse into a world in which mem-
bers of socially disfavored groups can obtain judicial acknowledgment
and affirmance of dignity without further indulging the nihilistic cul-
de-sac of victimhood. The challenge for proponents of racial justice
is to replicate this success by seeking dignity in race jurisprudence.
216 KING, supra note 2, at 292-93.
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